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Abstract. We study various formulations of the completeness of first-
order logic phrased in constructive type theory and mechanised in the
Coq proof assistant. Specifically, we examine the completeness of vari-
ants of classical and intuitionistic natural deduction and sequent calculi
with respect to model-theoretic, algebraic, and game-theoretic semantics.
As completeness with respect to the standard model-theoretic semantics
à la Tarski and Kripke is not readily constructive, we analyse connec-
tions of completeness theorems to Markov’s Principle and Weak Kőnig’s
Lemma and discuss non-standard semantics admitting assumption-free
completeness. We contribute a reusable Coq library for first-order logic
containing all results covered in this paper.
1 Introduction
Completeness theorems are central to the field of mathematical logic. Once com-
pleteness of a sound deduction system with respect to a semantic account of the
syntax is established, the infinitary notion of semantic validity is reduced to
the algorithmically tractable notion of syntactic deduction. In the case of first-
order logic, being the formalism underlying traditional mathematics based on a
set-theoretic foundation, completeness enables the use of semantic techniques to
study the deductive consequence of axiomatic systems.
The seminal completeness theorem for first-order logic proven by Gödel [26]
and later refined by Henkin [29,28] yields a syntactic deduction of every for-
mula valid in the canonical Tarski semantics, which is based on interpreting
the function and relation symbols in models providing the corresponding struc-
ture. However, this result may not be understood as an effective procedure in
the sense that a formal deduction for a formula satisfied by all models can be
computed by an algorithm, since even for finite signatures the proof relies on non-
constructive assumptions. It was already known to Gödel that for a complete-
ness proof the classically vacuous but constructively contested1 assumption of
Markov’s Principle, asserting that every non-diverging computation terminates,
is necessary [42]. Moreover, Gödel implicitly used a choice principle known as
1 Accepted in Russian constructivism while in conflict with Brouwer’s intuitionism
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Weak Kőnig’s Lemma [41] and it is a well-known result of reverse mathematics
that, over classical logic, the completeness theorem is in fact equivalent to Weak
Kőnig’s Lemma [65].
The aim of this paper is to coherently analyse the assumptions necessary to
prove completeness theorems concerning various semantics and deduction sys-
tems. For the analysis to be as precise as possible, we choose constructive type
theory with an impredicative universe of propositions as base system, a formali-
sation of intuitionistic logic with virtually no choice principles provable without
assumptions. Concretely, we work in the polymorphic calculus of cumulative in-
ductive constructions (pCuIC) [67] underlying the Coq proof assistant [70] and
in fact all results in this paper are mechanised in Coq, yielding Coq programs
for constructively given completeness proofs. For ease of language, we reserve
the term “constructive” for statements provable in this specific system, hence in
particular Markov’s Principle is classified as non-constructive [9,56].
Coming with an internal notion of computation, constructive type theory
allows us to state Markov’s Principle both internally as
MP := ∀f : N→ B.¬¬(∃n. f n = tt)→ ∃n. f n = tt
and similarly for any concrete model of computation (MPL), whereby the former
implies the latter. The second principle involved in Gödel’s proof, Weak Kőnig’s
Lemma (WKL), is a function existence principle asserting that every infinite
binary tree has an infinite path. WKL is not constructive, because it is equivalent
to a combination of a weak classical logical axiom and a weak choice axiom [3],
both deemed independent in pCuIC. The two main questions in focus are which
of these assumptions are necessary for particular formulations of completeness
and how the statements can be modified such that they hold constructively.
Applying this agenda to Tarski semantics, a first observation is that the
model existence theorem, central to Henkin’s completeness proof, holds con-
structively [31] for the →,∀,⊥-fragment of first-order logic if both the predicate
interpretation and satisfaction are defined as propositions rather than Boolean
functions. As a second observation, model existence directly implies that valid
formulas cannot be unprovable. Thus, for enumerable theories a single appli-
cation of MP, rendering enumerable predicates such as deduction stable under
double negation, yields completeness for this formulation of Tarski semantics.
Similarly, MPL yields the stability of deduction from finite contexts and hence
the corresponding form of completeness. Because MP is admissible in pCuIC [56],
so are MPL and the two completeness statements. For arbitrary theories, com-
pleteness becomes equivalent to the law of Excluded Middle (EM).
Regarding the second question of our agenda, we show that completeness
for the minimal →,∀-fragment does not depend on additional assumptions by
elaborating on a classical proof given in [62] Connectedly, we illustrate how
the interpretation of ⊥ can be relaxed to exploding models [72,44] admitting a
constructive completeness proof for the →,∀,⊥-fragment.
If, however, Tarski semantics is formulated using a Boolean interpretation for
predicates or even a Boolean satisfaction relation, completeness for arbitrary the-
ories becomes equivalent to both EM and WKL. Since EM and WKL are mutually
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independent in pCuIC, our perspective clarifies that WKL becomes necessary to
treat Boolean models only, and not e.g. to treat classical disjunction, as it might
be the case for intuitionistic disjunction [72].
Turning to intuitionistic logic, we discuss analogous relationships for Kripke
semantics and a cut-free intuitionistic sequent calculus [32]. Again, complete-
ness for the →,∀,⊥-fragment is equivalent to Markov’s Principle while being
constructive if restricted to the minimal →,∀-fragment or employing a relaxed
treatment of ⊥. The intuitionistically undefinable connectives ∨ and ∃ add fur-
ther complexity [33] and remain untreated in this paper. As a side note, we
explain how the constructivised completeness theorem for intuitionistic logic
can be used to implement a semantic cut-elimination procedure.
After considering such model-theoretic semantics, mainly based on embed-
ding the object-logic into the meta-logic, we exemplify two rather different ap-
proaches to assigning meaning to formulas, namely algebraic semantics and game
semantics. Differing fundamentally from model-theoretic semantics, both share
a constructive rendering of completeness for the full syntax of first-order logic,
agnostic to the intuitionistic or classical flavour of the deduction system.
In algebraic semantics, the embedding of formulas into the meta-logic is gen-
eralised to an evaluation in algebras providing the structure of the logical connec-
tives. In this setting, completeness follows from the observation that provability
induces such an algebra on formulas. We discuss intuitionistic and classical logic
evaluated in complete Heyting and complete Boolean algebras (cf. [63]).
Dialogue game semantics as introduced by Lorenzen [48,49], on the other
hand, completely disposes of interpreting logical connectives as operations on
truth values and instead understand logic as a dialectic game of assertion and
argument. An assertion is considered valid if every sceptic can be convinced
through substantive reasoning, i.e. if there is a strategy such that every argu-
ment about the assertion can be won. Hence, game semantics are inherently
closer to deduction systems than the previous semantic accounts and in fact a
general isomorphism of winning strategies and formal deductions has been es-
tablished [66]. We adapt this isomorphism such that it can be instantiated to a
first-order intuitionistic sequent calculus.
Contributions. The present paper is an extension of a previous conference
publication [17] in various directions: Firstly, we extend our previous complete-
ness proof for Tarski semantics restricted to closed formulas in the →,∀,⊥-
fragment to the full syntax with all connectives and allowing free variables in
Section 3.2. Secondly, we deduce compactness from model existence and analyse
the connection of Boolean models to WKL in Section 3.3. Thirdly, in Section 4
we give a more detailed treatment of algebraic semantics and discuss a general
completeness proof covering all at least intuitionistic natural deduction systems.
Fourthly, in the context of dialogue game semantics (Section 5), we provide a
simplified and formal proof of the equivalence of D and E-dialogues, a result hard
to reconstruct from the original literature [14]. Finally, we extend our reusable
Coq library2 for first-order logic to include all results covered in this paper.
2 On www.ps.uni-saarland.de/extras/fol-completeness-ext and hyperlinked with this document
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Outline. In Section 2, we begin with some preliminary definitions concerning
the syntax of first-order logic, deduction systems, and synthetic computability. In
Section 3, we then analyse completeness for model-theoretic semantics à la Tarski
(Section 3.1) and Kripke (Section 3.4) and the connections to Weak Kőnig’s
Lemma (Section 3.3) and Markov’s Principle (Section 3.5). Subsequently, we
give constructive completeness proofs for algebraic semantics (Section 4) and
dialogue game semantics (Section 5). We end with a discussion of related and
future work in Section 6 and provide appendices outlining the Coq mechanisation
(Appendix A) and the deduction systems used (Appendix B).
2 Syntax, Deduction, Computability
We work in a constructive type theory with a predicative hierarchy of type uni-
verses above a single impredicative universe P of propositions. Assumed type
formers are function spaces X → Y , products X × Y , sums X + Y , dependent
products ∀x : X.F x, and dependent sums Σ x : X.F x. The propositional ver-
sions of these connectives are denoted by the usual logical symbols (→, ∧, ∨, ∀,
and ∃) in addition to > : P and ⊥ : P denoting truth and falsity.
Basic inductive types are the the unit type 1 ::= ?, the Booleans B ::= tt | ff,
and the natural numbers N ::= 0 | Sn for n : N. Given a type X, we further
define options O(X) ::= ∅ | pxq and lists L(X) ::= [] | x :: A for x : X and
A : L(X). On lists we employ the standard notation for membership x ∈ A,
inclusion A ⊆ B, concatenation A ++B, and map f @A. These notations are
shared with vectors x : Xn of fixed length n : N. Possibly infinite collections are
expressed by sets p : X → P with set-theoretic notations like x ∈ p and p ⊆ q.
2.1 Syntax of First-Order Logic
We represent the terms and formulas of first-order logic as inductive types over a
fixed signature Σ = (FΣ ,PΣ) specialising function symbols f : FΣ and predicate
symbols P : PΣ together with their arities |f | : N and |P | : N. Variable binding
is implemented using de Bruijn indices [10] well-suited for mechanisation [69].
Definition 1. We define the terms and formulas of first-order logic by
t : T ::= x | f t ϕ,ψ : F ::= ⊥˙ | P t | ϕ→˙ψ | ϕ∧˙ψ | ϕ∨˙ψ | ∀˙ϕ | ∃˙ϕ x : N, f : FΣ , P : PΣ
where the vectors t are of the expected lengths |f | and |P |, respectively. We set
¬˙ϕ := ϕ→˙⊥˙ and isolate the type F∗ of formulas in the →,∀,⊥-fragment.
A bound variable is encoded as the number of quantifiers shadowing its rel-
evant binder, e.g. P x y → ∀x.∃y. P x y may be represented by P 7 4→˙∀˙ ∃˙P 1 0.
The variables 7 and 4 in this example are called free and variables that do not
occur freely are called fresh. A formula with no free variables is called closed.
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Definition 2. Instantiating with a substitution σ : N→ T is defined by
x[σ] := σ x ⊥˙[σ] := ⊥˙ (ϕ ψ)[σ] := ϕ[σ] ψ[σ]
(f t )[σ] := f (t [σ]) (P t )[σ] := P (t [σ]) (ϕ)[σ] := ϕ[↑σ]
where t [σ] is short for (λt. t[σ]) @ t, ↑σ denotes the substitution λn. σ (Sn), and is used as placeholder for the logical connectives and quantifiers, respectively.
Useful shorthands are ϕ[t;σ] for instantiating 0 with t and Sx with σ x,
ϕ[t] for ϕ[t;λx. x], and ↑ϕ for the shift ϕ[λx. Sx]. All terminology and notation
concerning formulas carries over to contexts Γ : L(F) and theories T : F → P.
For ease of notation we freely identify contexts Γ with their theory λϕ. ϕ ∈ Γ .
2.2 Deduction Systems
We represent deduction systems as inductive predicates of type L(F) → F → P
or similar. The archetypal system is natural deduction (ND), exemplified by an
intuitionistic version Γ ` ϕ as defined in Definition 89 of Appendix B. Since
most rules are standard, we only discuss the quantifier rules in more detail as
they rely on the de Bruijn representation of formulas:
↑Γ ` ϕ
Γ ` ∀˙ϕ AI
Γ ` ∀˙ϕ
Γ ` ϕ[t] AE
Γ ` ϕ[t]
Γ ` ∃˙ϕ EI
Γ ` ∃˙ϕ ↑Γ, ϕ `↑ψ
Γ ` ψ EE
Note that ↑Γ, ϕ is notation for ϕ ::↑Γ . In a shifted context ↑Γ there is no
reference to the variable 0 which hence plays the role of an arbitrary but fixed
individual. So if ↑Γ ` ϕ then we can conclude Γ ` ∀˙ϕ as expressed by the rule
(AI) for ∀-introduction. Similarly, the shifts in the rule (EE) for ∃-elimination
simulate that Γ together with ϕ instantiated to the witness provided by Γ ` ∃˙ϕ
proves ψ and hence admits the conclusion that already Γ ` ψ. For many proofs
it will be helpful to employ fresh variables explicitly as justified by Lemma 4,
which we state after observing weakening and substitutivity :
Lemma 3. If Γ ` ϕ, then ∆ ` ϕ for all ∆ ⊇ Γ and Γ [σ] ` ϕ[σ] for all σ.
Lemma 4. Given Γ , ϕ, and ψ one can compute a fresh variable x such that
1. ↑Γ ` ϕ iff Γ ` ϕ[x] and 2. ↑Γ, ϕ `↑ψ iff Γ, ϕ[x] ` ψ.
A classical variant Γ `c ϕ of the ND system can be obtained without refer-
ring to ⊥˙ by adding the axiom Γ `c ((ϕ→˙ψ)→˙ϕ)→˙ϕ expressing Peirce’s law
(Definition 90). Then the structural properties stated in the two lemmas above
are maintained while the typical classical proof rules become available.
Deduction systems such as intuitionistic ND introduced above naturally ex-
tend to theories by writing T ` ϕ if there is a finite context Γ ⊆ T with Γ ` ϕ.
Then T ` ϕ satisfies proof rules analogous to Γ ` ϕ.
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2.3 Synthetic Computability
Since every function definable in constructive type theory is computable, the
standard notions of computability theory can be synthesised by type-level oper-
ations [1,16], eliminating references to a concrete model of computation such as
Turing machines, µ-recursive functions, or the untyped lambda calculus.
Definition 5. Let X be a type and p : X → P be a predicate.
– p is decidable if there is f : X → B with ∀x. p x↔ f x = tt.
– p is enumerable if there is f : N→ O(X) with ∀x. p x↔ ∃n. f n = pxq.
These two notions generalise to predicates of higher arity as expected.
– X is enumerable if there is f : N→ O(X) with ∀x.∃n. f = pxq.
– X is discrete if equality λxy.x = y on X is decidable.
– X is a data type if it is both enumerable and discrete.
We assume that the components FΣ and PΣ of our fixed signature Σ are
data types. Then applying the terminology to the syntax and deductions systems
introduced in the previous sections leads to the following observations.
Fact 6. T and F are data types and Γ ` ϕ and Γ `c ϕ are enumerable.
Proof. By the techniques discussed in [16], e.g. Fact 3.19. uunionsq
The standard model-theoretic completeness proofs analysed in Section 3 re-
quire the assumption of Markov’s Principle. A proposition P : P is called stable if
¬¬P → P and, analogously, a predicate p : X → P is called stable if p x is stable
for all x. A synthetic version of Markov’s Principle states that satisfiability of
Boolean sequences is stable (cf. [51]):
MP := ∀f : N→ B.¬¬(∃n. f n = tt)→ ∃n. f n = tt
Note that MP is trivially implied by Excluded Middle EM := ∀P : P. P ∨ ¬P .
Moreover, MP regulates the behaviour of computationally tractable predicates:
Fact 7. MP holds iff all enumerable predicates on discrete types are stable.
Proof. The direction from left to right is Fact 2.18 in [16]. For the reverse di-
rection assume that enumerable predicates on discrete types are stable. Let
f : N → B and let p : 1 → P be defined by p x := ∃n. f n = tt. The pred-
icate p is enumerable by f n := if f n then p?q else ∅. Stability of p is now
equivalent to ¬¬(∃n. f n = tt)→ (∃n. f n = tt). uunionsq
As a consequence of Fact 6 and Fact 7, MP implies that the deduction systems
Γ ` ϕ and Γ `c ϕ are stable. In fact, only these stabilities are required for
the standard model-theoretic completeness proofs discussed in the next section
and they are equivalent to MPL, a version of Markov’s Principle stated for the
call-by-value λ-calculus L [57,22] and its halting problem E :
MPL := ∀s. ¬¬Es→ Es
We will prove the following in Section 3.5:
Lemma 8. MPL, stability of Γ ` ϕand stability of Γ `c ϕ are all equivalent.
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3 Model-Theoretic Semantics
The first variant of semantics we consider is based on the idea of interpreting
terms as objects in a model and embedding the logical connectives into the meta-
logic. A formula is considered valid if it is satisfied by all models. The simplest
case is Tarski semantics, coinciding with classical deduction via Henkin’s com-
pleteness proof factoring through a (constructive) model-existence theorem [30].
Kripke semantics, coinciding with intuitionistic deduction, add more structure
by connecting several models through an accessibility relation and admit a sim-
pler completeness proof using a universal model. In this section, we only consider
formulas ϕ : F∗ in the →,∀,⊥-fragment if not stated otherwise.
3.1 Tarski Semantics
Definition 9. A (Tarski) model M over a domain D is a pair of functions
_M : ∀f : FΣ . D|f | → D _M : ∀P : PΣ . D|P | → P.
Assignments ρ : N → D are extended to term evaluations ρˆ : T → D by
ρˆ x := ρ x and ρˆ (f t ) := fM (ρˆ@ t ) and to formulas via the relation M ρ ϕ
defined by
M ρ ⊥˙ := ⊥ M ρ ϕ→˙ψ := M ρ ϕ→M ρ ψ
M ρ P t := PM (ρˆ@ t ) M ρ ∀˙ϕ := ∀a : D.M a;ρ ϕ
where the assignment a; ρ maps 0 to a and Sx to ρ x. We write M  ϕ if
M ρ ϕ for all ρ. M is called classical if it validates all instances of Peirce’s
law, i.e.M  ((ϕ→˙ψ)→˙ϕ)→˙ϕ for all ϕ,ψ : F∗. We writeM ρ T ifMρ  ϕ for
all ϕ ∈ T and T  ϕ ifM ρ ϕ for every classicalM and ρ withM ρ T .
We first show that the classical deduction system Γ `c ϕ (restricted to the
considered →,∀,⊥-fragment) is sound for Tarski semantics.
Fact 10. Γ `c ϕ implies Γ  ϕ.
Proof. By induction on Γ `c ϕ similar to the soundness proof in [16, Fact 3.14].
The classical Peirce axioms Γ `c ((ϕ→˙ψ)→˙ϕ)→˙ϕ are sound given that we only
consider classical models. uunionsq
Formally, completeness denotes the converse property, i.e. that Γ  ϕ implies
Γ `c ϕ. We now outline a Henkin-style completeness proof for Γ `c ϕ based on
the presentation by Herbelin and Ilik [31]. The main idea is to factor through
a model existence theorem, stating that every consistent context is satisfied by
a syntactic model. The model existence theorem in turn is based on a theory
extension lemma generalising the role of ⊥˙ to an arbitrary substitute ϕ⊥:
Lemma 11. For every closed formula ϕ⊥ and closed T there is T ′ ⊇ T with:
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1. T ′ maintains ϕ⊥-consistency, i.e. T `c ϕ⊥ whenever T ′ `c ϕ⊥.
2. T ′ is deductively closed, i.e. ϕ ∈ T ′ whenever T ′ `c ϕ.
3. T ′ respects implication, i.e. ϕ→˙ψ ∈ T ′ iff ϕ ∈ T ′ → ψ ∈ T ′.
4. T ′ respects universal quantification, i.e. ∀˙ϕ ∈ T ′ iff ∀t. ϕ[t] ∈ T ′.
Proof. We fix an enumeration ϕn of F∗ such that x is fresh for ϕn if x ≥ n. The
extension can be separated into three steps, all maintaining ϕ⊥-consistency:
a. E ⊇ T which is exploding, i.e. (ϕ⊥→˙ϕ) ∈ E for all closed ϕ.
b. H ⊇ E which is Henkin, i.e. (ϕn[n]→˙∀˙ϕn) ∈ H for all n.
c. Ω ⊇ H which is maximal, i.e. ϕ ∈ Ω whenever Ω,ϕ `c ϕ⊥ implies Ω `c ϕ⊥.
Note that being exploding allows to use ϕ⊥ analogously to ⊥˙ and that being
Henkin ensures that there is no mismatch between the provability of a universal
formula and all its instances. We first argue why Ω satisfies the claims (1)-(4)
of the extension lemma.
1. Ω is a ϕ⊥-consistent extension of T since all steps maintain ϕ⊥-consistency.
2. Let Ω `c ϕ and assume Ω,ϕ `c ϕ⊥, so Ω `c ϕ⊥. Thus ϕ ∈ Ω per maximality.
3. The first direction is immediate as Ω is deductively closed. We prove the
converse using maximality, so assume Ω,ϕ→˙ψ `c ϕ⊥. It suffices to show
that Ω `c ϕ since then ϕ ∈ Ω, ψ ∈ Ω, and ultimately Ω `c ϕ⊥ follow.
Ω `c ϕ can be derived by proof rules for ϕ⊥ analogous to the ones for ⊥˙.
4. The first direction is again immediate by Ω being deductively closed and the
converse exploits that Ω is Henkin as follows. Suppose ∀t. ϕ[t] ∈ Ω and let
ϕ be ϕn in the given enumeration. Then in particular ϕn[n] ∈ Ω and since
Ω is Henkin also ϕn[n]→˙∀˙ϕn ∈ Ω which is enough to derive ∀˙ϕ ∈ Ω.
We now discuss the three extension steps separately:
a. Since the requirement is unconditional, we just add all needed formulas:
E := T ∪ {ϕ⊥→˙ϕ | ϕ closed}
We only have to argue that E maintains ϕ⊥-consistency over T . So suppose
E `c ϕ⊥, meaning that Γ `c ϕ⊥ for some Γ ⊆ E . We show that all added in-
stances of explosion for ϕ⊥ in Γ can be eliminated. Indeed, for Γ = ∆,ϕ⊥→˙ϕ
we have ∆ `c (ϕ⊥→˙ϕ)→˙ϕ⊥ and hence ∆ `c ϕ⊥ by the Peirce rule. Thus by
iteration there is Γ ′ ⊆ T with Γ ′ `c ϕ⊥, justifying T `c ϕ⊥.
b. As above, to make E Henkin we just add all necessary Henkin-axioms
H := E ∪ {ϕn[n]→˙∀˙ϕn | n : N}
and justify that the extension maintains ϕ⊥-consistency. So let Γ `c ϕ⊥ for
some Γ ⊆ H, we again show that all added instances can be eliminated.
Hence suppose Γ = ∆,ϕn[n]→˙∀˙ϕn. Once can show that in a context ∆′
extending ∆ by suitable instances of ϕ⊥-explosion one can derive ∆′ `c ϕ⊥.
In this derivation one exploits that n is fresh for ϕn and that the input theory
E is closed. Thus ultimately E `c ϕ⊥.
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c. The last step maximisesH by adding all formulas maintaining ϕ⊥-consistency:
Ω0 := H Ωn+1 := Ωn∪{ϕn | Ωn, ϕn `c ϕ⊥ implies Ωn `c ϕ⊥} Ω :=
⋃
n:N
Ωn
Note that Ω maintains ϕ⊥-consistency over all Ωn and hence H by construc-
tion so it remains to justify that Ω is maximal. So suppose Ω,ϕn `c ϕ⊥
implies Ω `c ϕ⊥, we have to show that ϕn ∈ Ω. This is the case if the
condition in the definition of Ωn+1 is satisfied, so let Ωn, ϕn `c ϕ⊥. Then
by the assumed implication Ω `c ϕ⊥ and since Ω maintains ϕ⊥-consistency
over Ωn also Ωn `c ϕ⊥ as required. uunionsq
The generalisation via the falsity substitute ϕ⊥ will become important later,
for now the instance ϕ⊥ := ⊥˙ suffices. Also note that in usual jargon the ex-
tension T ′ of a consistent theory T is called maximal consistent, as no further
formulas can be added to T ′ without breaking consistency.
Maximal consistent theories T give rise to equivalent syntactic models MT
over the domain T of terms by setting fT t := f t and P T t := (P t ∈ T ). We
then observe thatMT σ ϕ iff ϕ[σ] ∈ T for all substitutions σ by a straighfor-
ward induction on ϕ using the properties stated in Lemma 11. Hence in particular
MT id ϕ iff ϕ ∈ T for the identity substitution idx := x. From this observation
we directly conclude the model existence theorem:
Theorem 12. Every closed and consistent theory is satisfied in a classical model.
Proof. Let T be closed and consistent and let T ′ be its extension per Lemma 11
for ϕ⊥ := ⊥˙. To show MT ′ id T , let ϕ ∈ T , hence ϕ ∈ T ′. Then since MT ′
is equivalent to T ′ we concludeMT ′ id ϕ as desired. Finally,MT ′ is classical
due to (2) of Lemma 11. uunionsq
The model existence theorem yields completeness up to double negation:
Fact 13. T  ϕ implies ¬¬(T `c ϕ) for arbitrary T and ϕ.
Proof. First, suppose that T  ϕ for closed T and ϕ and assume T 6`c ϕ which is
equivalent to T , ¬˙ϕ being consistent. But then there must be a model of T , ¬˙ϕ
in conflict to the assumption T  ϕ.
To extend this result to arbitrary T and ϕ one can simply close them by
replacing all free variables with fresh constants. We spell out the details of this
construction in Lemma 26. uunionsq
In fact, the remaining double negation elimination turns out to be necessary:
Fact 14. Completeness of Γ `c ϕ is equivalent to stability of Γ `c ϕ.
Proof. Assuming stability, Fact 13 directly yields the completeness of Γ `c ϕ.
Conversely, assume completeness and let ¬¬(Γ `c ϕ). Employing completeness,
to get Γ `c ϕ it suffices to show Γ, ¬˙ϕ  ⊥˙, so supposeM ρ Γ, ¬˙ϕ for someM
and ρ. As we now aim at a contradiction, we can turn ¬¬(Γ `c ϕ) into Γ `c ϕ
and therefore obtain Γ c ϕ by soundness, a conflict toM ρ Γ, ¬˙ϕ. uunionsq
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Hence, we can characterise completeness of classical ND as follows.
Theorem 15. 1. Completeness of Γ `c ϕ is equivalent to MPL.
2. Completeness of T `c ϕ for enumerable T is equivalent to MP.
3. Completeness of T `c ϕ for arbitrary T is equivalent to EM.
Proof. 1. By Fact 14 completeness is equivalent to the stability of Γ `c ϕ which
is shown equivalent to MPL in Section 3.5.
2. T `c ϕ for enumerable T is enumerable, hence stable under MP and thus
complete per Fact 13. For the converse, assume a function f : N → B
and consider T := (λϕ. ϕ = ⊥˙ ∧ ∃n. f n = tt). Since T is enumerable,
completeness yields that T  ⊥˙ is equivalent to T `c ⊥˙ which in turn is
equivalent to ∃n. f n = tt. Then since T  ⊥˙ is stable so must be ∃n. f n = tt.
3. EM particularly implies that T `c ϕ is stable and hence complete. Conversely
given a proposition P : P, completeness for T := (λϕ. ϕ = ⊥˙ ∧ P ) yields the
stability of P with an argument as in (2). uunionsq
Having analysed the usual Henkin-style completeness proof, we now turn
to its constructivisation. The central observation is that completeness already
holds constructively for the minimal →,∀-fragment, by an elaboration of the
classical proof for the minimal fragment given in [62]. To this end, we further
restrict the deduction system and semantics to the minimal fragment and prove
completeness via a suitable form of model existence.
Lemma 16. In the→,∀-fragment, for closed T and ϕ there is a classical modelM
and an assignment ρ such that (1)M ρ T and (2)M ρ ϕ implies T `c ϕ.
Proof. Let T ′ be the extension of T for ϕ⊥ := ϕ. As before, we haveMT ′ id T ′.
So now letMT ′ id ϕ, then ϕ ∈ T ′ and T `c ϕ by (1) of Lemma 11. uunionsq
Corollary 17. In the →,∀-fragment, Γ  ϕ implies Γ `c ϕ for closed Γ and ϕ.
As opposed to completeness for fomulas incorporating ⊥˙, completeness in
the minimal fragment does not rely on consistency requirements. Consequently,
if these requirements are eliminated by allowing models treating inconsistency
more liberal, completeness for formulas with ⊥˙ can be established construc-
tively (cf. [72,44]).
So we now turn back to the →,∀,⊥-fragment and define a satisfaction rela-
tionM Aρ ϕ for arbitrary propositions A with the relaxed rule (M Aρ ⊥˙) := A.
A model M is A-exploding if M A ⊥˙ → ϕ for all ϕ and exploding if it is A-
exploding for some choice of A. Note that A := > and PM t := > in particular
yields an exploding model satisfying all formulas, hence accommodating incon-
sistent theories. This leads to the following formulation of model existence.
Lemma 18. For every closed theory T there is an exploding classical modelM
and an assignment ρ such that (1)M Aρ T and (2)M Aρ ⊥˙ implies T `c ⊥˙.
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Proof. Let T be closed and let T ′ be its extension for ϕ⊥ := ⊥˙. We set A :=
⊥˙ ∈ T ′ and observe that the syntactic model MT ′ still coincides with T ′, i.e.
MT ′ Aσ ϕ iff ϕ[σ] ∈ T ′. Hence we have (1) MT ′ Aid T . Moreover, MT ′ is
A-exploding since proving MT ′ Aσ ⊥˙ → ϕ in this case means to prove that
⊥˙→˙ϕ[σ] ∈ T ′, a straightforward consequence of T ′ being deductively closed.
Finally, (2) follows from (1) of Lemma 11 as seen before. uunionsq
We write Γ e ϕ if M Aρ ϕ for all A : P and A-exploding M and ρ with
M Aρ Γ and finally establish completeness with respect to exploding models:
Fact 19. Γ e ϕ implies Γ `c ϕ for closed Γ and ϕ.
Proof. Let Γ e ϕ, then Γ, ¬˙ϕ `c ⊥˙ follows by Lemma 18 for T := Γ, ¬˙ϕ. uunionsq
3.2 Completeness Extended to Full Syntax and Free Variables
The completeness statements discussed in the previous section impose syntactic
limitations in two ways: we only considered formulas belonging to the →,∀,⊥-
fragment and did not explain the treatment of free variables underlying Fact 13.
Both of these shortcomings are addressed in this section.
First, we show how completeness for the full syntax F can be reduced to
completeness for the fragment F∗. To this end, we formally distinguish the de-
duction systems Γ `∗c ϕ and Γ `c ϕ and satisfaction relations M ∗ρ ϕ and
M ρ ϕ involving formulas from F∗ and F, respectively. As mentioned earlier,
the classical deduction system Γ `∗c ϕ is already suitable to encode the missing
connectives via the usual classical equivalents. However, if we extend the Tarski
semanticsM ∗ρ ϕ to formulas ϕ : F in the natural way, in particular by setting
M ρ ϕ∨˙ψ := M ρ ϕ ∨M ρ ψ M ρ ∃˙ϕ := ∃a : D.M a;ρ ϕ
then classical logic on the meta-level becomes necessary to tame the con-
structively stronger notions of disjunction and existence.
For ease of readability, we identify formulas in F∗ with their identity embed-
ding into F. The converse encoding of F into F∗ is defined as follows:
Definition 20. We define the de Morgan translation ϕM from F to F∗ by
(ϕ∧˙ψ)M := ¬˙(ϕM→˙¬˙ψM ) (ϕ∨˙ψ)M := ¬˙ϕM→˙ψM (∃˙ϕ)M := ¬˙∀˙¬˙ϕM
in the crucial cases and with the remaining syntax just recursively traversed.
We verify that the deduction system indeed cannot distinguish formulas from
their de Morgan translations:
Lemma 21. Γ `c ϕ iff Γ `c ϕM and in particular Γ `c ϕ iff ΓM `∗c ϕM .
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Proof. The first equivalence is by induction on ϕ with Γ generalised with the
backwards directions relying on the classical (P) rule as expected. The impli-
cation from Γ `c ϕ to ΓM `∗c ϕM is by induction on Γ `c ϕ employing that
substitution commutes with the de Morgan translation. The converse implication
follows with the first equivalence since all fragment deductions can be replayed
in the full system. uunionsq
Turning to the semantics, the deductive equivalence can be mimicked when
assuming classical logic.
Lemma 22. Given EM, we haveM ρ ϕ iffM ∗ρ ϕM for allM and ρ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ with ρ generalised, using EM to get from ϕM to ϕ. uunionsq
Corollary 23. Given EM, T  ϕ implies T M ∗ ϕM for all T and ϕ.
Therefore, we can conclude a completeness statement as follows.
Theorem 24. Given EM, T  ϕ implies T `c ϕ for closed T and ϕ in F.
Proof. By composing Corollary 23, Theorem 15, and Lemma 21. uunionsq
Note that this concluding theorem requires full classical logic as analysed
before in Theorem 15. Moreover, so does the general statement of Lemma 22:
Fact 25. IfM ρ ϕ iffM ∗ρ ϕM for all Σ,M and ρ, then EM holds.
Proof. Given a proposition P , we instantiate the assumed equivalence with the
signature containing only a single propositional variable p, the model M on
domain 1 interpreting p as P , and the constant environment ρn := ?. Then the
claim P ∨¬P can be expressed asM ρ p∨˙¬˙p. By the assumed equivalence, we
just need to proveM ∗ρ (p∨˙¬˙p)M which reduces to the tautology ¬P → ¬P .
However, we suspect that Corollary 23 actually requires only a weaker as-
sumption due to the restriction to classical models in the relation T  ϕ.
Secondly, to extend the completeness results to open theories, we show that
the free variables of such theories may be replaced with fresh constants, thereby
closing them, without changing any of their consequences up to substitution of
constants. Note that as our construction requires ϕ⊥ to be a closed formula,
which means shifting the free variables to guarantee the presence of countably
many unused free variables, such as in [31], will not be sufficient.
For this, we take Σc to be the extension of a signature Σ with countably many
new constants c− : N→ FΣc and ⇑ : FΣ → FΣc to be the associated embedding
of formulas. We then define a dropping operation ⇓m: FΣc → FΣ which replaces
occurrences of cn with the variable m + n. This index is necessary as variables
have to be shifted when moving below quantifiers to refer to the intended free
variable. We can now extend the constructivised completeness result to open
theories and formulas.
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Lemma 26. If T  ϕ entails ¬¬(T `c ϕ) for closed T and ϕ, then this can be
extended to arbitrary T and ϕ.
Proof. For this we need the following intermediary facts which are proven per
induction on the formula and the derivation, respectively.
(1) For any ϕ, ϕ[c−] is closed and ⇓0 ((⇑ϕ)[c−]) = ϕ
(2) For any T and ϕ, T  ϕ→⇑T ⇑ϕ and ϕ, T `c ϕ→⇓mT `c⇓mϕ
We may then derive the claim by the following sequence of implications:
T  ϕ
→ ⇑T ⇑ϕ (2)
→ (⇑T )[c−]  (⇑ϕ)[c−] Weakening under substitution
→ ¬¬((⇑T )[c−] `c (⇑ϕ)[c−]) Assumption, (1)
→ ¬¬(⇓((⇑T )[c−]) `c⇓((⇑ϕ)[c−])) (2)
→ ¬¬T `c ϕ (1) uunionsq
3.3 Compactness and Weak Kőnig’s Lemma
We have proved the model existence theorem for classical models fully construc-
tively and deduced completeness of provability in arbitrary theories using EM.
Recall that we defined both the interpretation of atoms in a model and the
satisfiability relation to be propositional, as is most natural in our setting. In
classical presentations, defining satisfiability as relation is equivalent to a defini-
tion as Boolean function by relying on EM. In type theory however, identifying
relations with Boolean functions needs choice axioms. In this section, we analyse
the connection between Weak Kőnig’s Lemma and the model existence theo-
rem w.r.t. models employing Boolean interpretations of symbols and Boolean
satisfaction relations.
Definition 27. We call a classical model decidable if its predicate interpretation
is decidable, and omniscient if the satisfiability relation is.
Lemma 28. Non-empty omniscient models are decidable. Decidable models with
finite domain are omniscient.
Neither classicality nor decidability imply omniscience, and nor do they imply
each other: The standard model for (Heyting) arithmetic in type theory is decid-
able (because equality on natural numbers is), but can neither be proved classical
(because type theory is constructive), nor omniscient (because of Hilbert’s tenth
problem). A model where the domain ranges over Turing machines for a signa-
ture with exactly one unary predicate denoting Turing machine halting is not
decidable (and thus not omniscient), but classical under the assumption of EM.
In classical reverse mathematics, where one assumes classical logic but only
restricted forms of set existence axioms and induction, it is a well-known theorem
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that the model existence theorem and the compactness theorem are equivalent
to Weak Kőnig’s Lemma (WKL) if satisfiability is a Boolean function [65], i.e. if
model-existence is phrased for omniscient models. A similar analysis is carried
out in publications on constructive reverse mathematics, where one does not
assume classical logic, but the axiom of countable or even dependent choice.
However, we are only aware of an analysis for the compactness theorem for
propositional logic rather than first-order logic, which is equivalent to WKL for
decidable trees [12].
We start by deducing the compactness theorem for various classes of models.
The compactness theorem already appeared in Gödel’s seminal paper [25] and
states that a theory T has a model if every context Γ ⊆ T has a model. It is in
fact easy to deduce the compactness theorem for classes of models which are at
least classical from model existence:
Theorem 29. Let C be a predicate on models s.t. CM implies thatM is clas-
sical. Then the model existence theorem for models in C implies the compactness
theorem for models in C. Formally, for every signature Σ:
(∀T . T 6`c ⊥˙ → ∃M. CM∧M  T )
→(∀T . (∀Γ ⊆ T .∃M. CM∧M  Γ )→ ∃M. CM∧M  T )
Proof. Let T be a theory. It suffices to prove thatM  Γ for Γ ⊆ T and CM
implies Γ 6`c ⊥˙, which follows directly using Fact 10. uunionsq
Corollary 30. If every Γ ⊆ T has a classical model, T has a classical model.
We continue by proving that compactness for decidable models implies WKL.
We introduce WKL formally:
Definition 31. A binary tree is a non-empty and prefix-closed predicate
τ : L(B)→ P, i.e. τ [] holds and τ v implies τ u for all prefixes u of v.
A binary tree τ is infinite if ∀k. ∃u. τu∧ |u| ≥ k and τ has an infinite path if
∃f : N→ B.∀n. τ [f 0, . . . , f n].
WKL states that every infinite binary tree has an infinite path. WKLD states
that every decidable infinite binary tree has an infinite path.
Note that in the context of constructive reverse mathematics (e.g. in [12])
WKL is only stated for decidable trees. We however need both notions and thus
distinguish them by an index.
WKL is a consequence of compactness for decidable models. The proof is es-
sentially the same as the one for propositional logic and WKLD by Diener [12]
and the one for first-order logic using the classical base theory RCA0 by Simp-
son [65]. Intuitively, given a tree τ , one can construct a formula ϕn over the
siganture ΣN which is satisfiable iff τ contains an element of length n.
Definition 32. We define the signature ΣN := (⊥,N) with constant arity 0, i.e.
no term symbols and countably many propositions Pi.
Completeness Theorems for FOL Analysed in Constructive Type Theory 15
Fact 33. There is a function L− : N→ L(L(B)) s.t. ∀l : L(B). |l| = n↔ l ∈ Ln.
For example the tree τ l := l = [] ∨ ∃l′. l = tt :: l′ contains the elements
[tt, tt, tt], [tt, tt,ff], [tt,ff, tt], [tt,ff,ff]
of length 3 and we build the formula
ϕ3 := (P0∧˙P1∧˙P2)∨˙(P0∧˙P1∧˙¬˙P1)∨˙(P0∧˙¬˙P1∧˙P2)∨˙(P0∧˙¬˙P1∧˙¬˙P1).
Now for an infinite tree every context in the theory T := {ϕn | n : N} is
satisfiable by an (omniscient) model, because the tree is infinite. By compactness,
the interpretation of Pi in a decidable model for the whole theory yields an
infinite path through τ .
Since trees are not necessarily decidable predicates, it is not possible to con-
struct a list of elements up to length n explicitly, and thus not possible to con-
struct ϕn explicitly. However, we can prove the double-negation of the existence
of such lists using a filtering predicate:
Definition 34. We define the filtering L′ of a list L under a predicate P :
[] ⊆P []
Px L ⊆P L′
x :: L ⊆P x :: L′
¬Px L ⊆P L′
x :: L ⊆P L′
Fact 35. ∀L.¬¬∃L′.L ⊆P L′
Given a tree τ we can define the (singleton) theory Tn where all elements
have the shape of ϕn described above:
Tn :=
{
ϕ | ∃L.Ln ⊆τ L ∧ ϕ =
∨[∧[
P
(b)
i | b ∈ l at position i
]
| l ∈ L
]}
where P (b)i := Pi if b = tt and P
(b)
i := ¬˙Pi if b = ff.
This preparation now suffices to prove the following central Lemma:
Lemma 36. Given a tree τ one can construct a theory T over ΣN s.t.
1. If τ is infinite, all Γ ⊆ T have an omniscient model.
2. If τ is infinite and decidable, T is decidable.
3. If T has a decidable model, ∃f : N→ B.∀n.¬¬τ [f 0, . . . , f n].
Proof. Let τ be given. We define the theory T := {ϕ | ∃n. P nϕ}
Given u : L(B) we can define the omniscient model Mu which satisfies the
atom ai if i > |u| or the i-th element of u is tt.
We need the following lemmas:
a. ∀Γ ⊆ T .∃L : L(N).∀ϕ ∈ Γ.∃n ∈ L.ϕ ∈ Tn.
b. For omniscient models M and ϕn ∈ Tn, ϕm ∈ Tm, and n ≥ m we have
ρ M ϕn → ρ M ϕm.
c. For all u s.t. τu we have ∀n ≤ |u|.∀ϕ.ϕ ∈ Tn →Mu  ψ.
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d. ∀n.¬¬∃ϕ.ϕ ∈ Tn.
e. If T has a decidable modelM, the function fi := tt ifM  Pi and fi := ff
otherwise fulfills ∀nϕ. Tn ϕ→ T [f 0, . . . , f n].
The proof of (a) is by induction on Γ . The proof of (b) is technical but not
hard. The proof of (c) is straightforward using (b). The proof of (d) uses Fact 35.
The proof of (e) is again technical but not hard.
Now for claim (1) let τ be infinite and Γ ⊆ T . We use (a) and compute the
maximum m of L. By infinity of τ there is u s.t. τu and |u| ≥ m and by (c)Mu
satisfies all ϕ ∈ Γ .
Claim (2) is by computing the filtering of Ln using the decider for τ .
Claim (3) is immediate from (d) and (e). uunionsq
Corollary 37. Given EM, compactness for decidable models implies WKL.
Corollary 38. Compactness for decidable models implies WKLD, even if com-
pacteness is only assumed for decidable theories.
Note that since compactness for enumerable theories implies compactness for
decidable theories, the latter implication also holds for compactness w.r.t. enu-
merable theories. It seems however that this proof cannot be directly strength-
ened to also yield WKL for enumerable trees.
As a last step we prove that WKL makes every logically decidable predicate
on data types decidable:
Lemma 39. Let p s.t. ∀n : N. p n∨¬p n. Then WKL implies that p is decidable.
Proof. We define a tree τ which contains prefixes of a decider for p as τ u := ∀b ∈
u at position i. b = tt↔ p i. Now τ is infinite because we can prove the existence
of lists of arbitrary length in τ . An infinite path through τ decides p. uunionsq
Corollary 40. EM∧WKL implies that every predicate on data types is decidable.
Lemma 41. If every predicate on data types is decidable, model existence for
omniscient models holds.
Proof. Model existence is constructively provable. The model is omniscient by
assumption since M can equivalently be seen as a predicate L(D)×F→ P. uunionsq
This suffices to state our final equivalence theorem for Tarski semantics:
Theorem 42. The following are equivalent for arbitrary theories:
1. Completeness of T `c ϕ for omniscient/decidable models.
2. EM and model existence for omniscient/decidable models.
3. EM and compactness for omniscient/decidable models.
4. EM and WKL.
5. Every predicate on data types is decidable.
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In other words, completeness of T `c ϕ w.r.t. omniscient and decidable
models is equivalent to a purely logical principle (EM) and a function existence
principle (WKL). Item (5) is reminiscent of the axiom CC∨ used in [3], where
WKLD is proven equivalent to LLPO ∧ Π01 -CC∨ Given that under EM, WKL is
equivalent to Brouwer’s fan theorem FAN [3], we could have stated item (4)
equivalently as EM ∧ FAN.
If one is interested in similar equivalences to completeness of Γ `c ϕ and
T `c ϕ for enumerable T w.r.t. omniscient and decidable models, our previous
analysis has yielded that the corresponding logical principles will be MPL and MP
respectively instead of EM. To the best of our knowledge, it is an open question
which function existence or choice principle replaces WKL in this situation, i.e.
which adjustment of WKL, CC∨, or FAN becomes necessary.
3.4 Kripke Semantics
Turning to intuitionistic logic, we present Kripke semantics immediately gener-
alised to arbitrary interpretations of falsity.
Definition 43. A Kripke model K over a domain D is a preorder (W,) with
_K : ∀f : FΣ . D|f | → D _K : ∀P : PΣ .W → D|P | → P ⊥K : W → P.
The interpretations of predicates and falsity are required to be monotone, i.e.
PKv a → PKw a and ⊥Kv → ⊥Kw whenever v  w. Assignments ρ and their term
evaluations ρˆ are extended to formulas via the relation w ρ ϕ defined by
w ρ ⊥˙ := ⊥Kw w ρ ϕ→˙ψ := ∀v  w. v ρ ϕ→ v ρ ψ
w ρ P t := PKw (ρˆ@ t ) w ρ ∀˙ϕ := ∀a : D.w a;ρ ϕ
We write K  ϕ if w ρ ϕ for all ρ and w. K is standard if ⊥Kw implies ⊥ for
all w and exploding if K  ⊥˙→˙ϕ for all ϕ. We write T  ϕ if K ρ ϕ for all
standard K and ρ with K ρ T , and T e ϕ when relaxing to exploding models.
Note that standard models are exploding, hence T e ϕ implies T  ϕ.
Moreover, the monotonicity required for the predicate and falsity interpreta-
tions lifts to all formulas, i.e. w ρ ϕ implies v ρ ϕ whenever w  v. This
property together with the usual facts about the interaction of assignments and
substitutions yields soundness:
Fact 44. Γ ` ϕ implies Γ e ϕ.
Proof. By induction on Γ ` ϕ and analogous to [16, Fact 3.34]. uunionsq
Turning to completeness, instead of showing that Γ e ϕ implies Γ ` ϕ di-
rectly, we follow Herbelin and Lee [32] and reconstruct a formal derivation in the
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normal sequent calculus LJT, hence implementing a cut-elimination procedure.
LJT is defined by judgements Γ⇒ϕ and Γ ;ψ⇒ϕ for a focused formula ψ:
Γ ;ϕ⇒ϕ A
Γ ;ϕ⇒ψ ϕ ∈ Γ
Γ⇒ψ C
Γ⇒ϕ Γ ;ψ⇒θ
Γ ;ϕ→˙ψ⇒θ IL
Γ, ϕ⇒ψ
Γ⇒ϕ→˙ψ IR
Γ ;ϕ[t]⇒ψ
Γ ; ∀˙ϕ⇒ψ AL
↑Γ⇒ϕ
Γ⇒∀˙ϕ AR
Γ⇒⊥˙
Γ⇒ϕ E
Fact 45. Every sequent Γ⇒ϕ can be translated into a normal derivation Γ ` ϕ.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on both forms of judgements, where every
sequent Γ ;ψ⇒ϕ is translated to an implication from Γ ` ψ to Γ ` ϕ. uunionsq
By the previous fact, completeness for LJT implies completeness for intu-
itionistic ND. The technique to establish completeness for Kripke semantics is
based on universal models coinciding with intuitionistic provability. We in fact
construct two syntactic Kripke models over the domain T.
– An exploding model U on contexts s.t. Γ Uσ ϕ iff Γ⇒ϕ[σ].
– A standard model C on consistent contexts s.t. Γ Cσ ϕ iff ¬¬(Γ⇒ϕ[σ]).
These constructions are adaptions of those in [73], which in turn are based
on the proof and comments in [32]. We begin with the exploding model U .
Definition 46. The model U over the domain T of terms is defined on the
contexts Γ preordered by inclusion ⊆. Further, we set:
f U d := f d P UΓ d := Γ⇒P d ⊥UΓ := Γ⇒⊥˙
The desired properties of U can be derived from the next lemma, which takes
the shape of a normalisation-by-evaluation procedure [4,13].
Lemma 47. In the universal Kripke model U the following hold.
1. Γ σ ϕ→ Γ⇒ϕ[σ]
2. (∀Γ ′ψ. Γ ⊆ Γ ′ → Γ ′ ;ϕ[σ]⇒ψ → Γ ′⇒ψ)→ Γ σ ϕ
Proof. We prove (1) and (2) at once by induction on ϕ generalising Γ and σ.
We only discuss the case of implications ϕ→˙ψ in full detail.
1. Assuming ∀Γ ′. Γ ⊆ Γ ′ → Γ ′ σ ϕ → Γ ′ σ ψ, one has to derive that
Γ⇒(ϕ→˙ψ)[σ]. Per (IR) and inductive hypothesis (2) for ψ it suffices to
show Γ, ϕ[σ] σ ψ. Applying the inductive hypothesis (2) for ϕ and the
assumption, it suffices to show that Γ ′ ;ϕ[σ]⇒θ[σ] implies Γ ′⇒θ[σ] for any
Γ, ϕ[σ] ⊆ Γ ′ and θ, which holds per (C).
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2. Assuming ∀Γ ′ θ. Γ ⊆ Γ ′ → Γ ′ ; (ϕ→˙ψ)[σ]⇒θ → Γ ′⇒θ one has to deduce
Γ ′ σ ϕ entailing Γ ′ σ ψ for any Γ ⊆ Γ ′. Because of the inductive hy-
pothesis (2) for ψ it suffices to show ∆ ;ψ[σ]⇒ θ implying ∆⇒ θ for any
Γ ′ ⊆ ∆. By using the assumption, ∆⇒θ reduces to ∆ ; (ϕ→˙ψ)[σ]⇒θ. This
follows by (IL), as the assumption Γ ′ σ ϕ implies ∆⇒ϕ[σ] per inductive
hypothesis (2). uunionsq
Corollary 48. U is exploding and satisfies Γ σ ϕ iff Γ⇒ϕ[σ].
Proof. Suppose that Γ ⇒ ⊥˙, then (2) of Lemma 47 yields that Γ σ ϕ for
arbitrary ϕ. Thus U is exploding. The claimed equivalence then follows by (1)
of Lemma 47 and soundness of LJT. uunionsq
Being universal, U witnesses completeness for exploding Kripke models:
Fact 49. 1. Γ e ϕ implies Γ⇒ϕ.
2. In the →,∀-fragment, Γ  ϕ implies Γ⇒ϕ.
Proof. 1. Since Γ Uid Γ we have that Γ e ϕ implies Γ Uid ϕ and hence Γ⇒ϕ.
2. In the minimal fragment, ⊥˙ remains uninterpreted and hence imposes no
condition on the models. Hence U yields the completeness in this case.
Before we move on to completeness for standard models, we illustrate how
the previous fact already establishes the cut rule for LJT.
Lemma 50. If Γ⇒ϕ and Γ ;ϕ⇒ψ, then Γ⇒ψ.
Proof. By the translation given in Fact 45, we obtain a derivation Γ ` ψ from
the two assumptions. This can be turned into Γ⇒ψ using soundness (Fact 44)
and completeness (Fact 49).
We now construct the universal standard model C as a refinement of U . As
standard models require that ⊥Kv implies ⊥ for any v, the model U has to be
restricted to the consistent contexts, those which do not prove ⊥˙.
Definition 51. The model C over the domain T of terms is defined on the
consistent contexts Γ 6⇒⊥˙ preordered by inclusion ⊆. Further, we set:
f C d := f d P CΓ d := ¬¬(Γ⇒P d) ⊥ CΓ := ⊥
Note that C is obviously standard and that we weakened the interpretation
of atoms to doubly negated provability. This admits the following normalisation-
by-evaluation procedure for doubly negated sequents:
Lemma 52. In the universal Kripke model C the following hold.
1. Γ σ ϕ→ ¬¬(Γ⇒ϕ[σ])
2. (∀Γ ′ψ. Γ ⊆ Γ ′ → Γ ′ ;ϕ[σ]⇒ψ → ¬¬(Γ ′⇒ψ))→ Γ σ ϕ
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Proof. We prove (1) and (2) at once by induction on ϕ generalising Γ and σ.
Most cases are completely analogous to those in Lemma 47. Therefore we only
discuss the crucial case (1) for implications ϕ→˙ψ.
1. Assuming Γ σ ϕ→˙ψ we need to derive ¬¬(Γ⇒ϕ[σ]→˙ψ[σ]). So we assume
¬(Γ⇒ϕ[σ]→˙ψ[σ]) and derive a contradiction. Because of the negative goal,
we may assume that either Γ, ϕ[σ] is consistent or not. In the positive case,
we proceed as in Lemma 47 since the extended context is a node in C.
On the other hand, if Γ, ϕ[σ]⇒ ⊥˙, then Γ, ϕ[σ]⇒ ψ[σ] by (E) and hence
Γ⇒ϕ[σ]→˙ψ[σ] by (IR), contradicting the assumption. uunionsq
Corollary 53. C satisfies Γ σ ϕ iff ¬¬(Γ⇒ϕ[σ]).
Proof. The first direction is (1) of Lemma 52 and the converse follows with (2)
since ¬¬(Γ⇒ϕ[σ]) and Γ ′ ;ϕ[σ]⇒ψ for Γ ′ ⊇ Γ together imply ¬¬(Γ ′⇒ψ) via
the cut rule established in Lemma 50. uunionsq
The advantage of the additional double negations is that, in contrast to the
proof in [32], we only need a single application of stability to derive completeness.
Thus we can prove the completeness of Γ ` ϕ admissible in Section 3.5.
Fact 54. 1. Γ  ϕ implies Γ⇒ϕ, provided that Γ⇒ϕ is stable.
2. Γ  ϕ implies Γ ` ϕ, provided that Γ ` ϕ is stable.
Proof. 1. Since Γ  ϕ implies ¬¬(Γ⇒ϕ), we can conclude Γ⇒ϕ per stability.
2. Since Γ⇒ϕ iff Γ ` ϕ per soundness and completeness (Facts 44 and 49). uunionsq
Conversely, unrestricted completeness requires the stability of classical ND.
Fact 55. Completeness of Γ⇒ϕ implies stability of Γ `c ϕ.
Proof. Assume completeness of Γ ⇒ ϕ and suppose ¬¬(Γ `c ϕ). We prove
Γ `c ϕ, so it suffices to show Γ, ¬˙ϕ `c ⊥˙. Employing a standard double-
negation translation ϕN on formulas ϕ, it is equivalent to establish (Γ, ¬˙ϕ)N⇒⊥˙.
Applying completeness, however, we may assume a standard model K with
K ρ (Γ, ¬˙ϕ)N and derive a contradiction. Hence we conclude Γ `c ϕ and
so ΓN  ϕN from ¬¬(Γ `c ϕ) and soundness, in conflict to K ρ (Γ, ¬˙ϕ)N . uunionsq
Thus, the completeness of intuitionistic ND is similar to the classical case.
Theorem 56. 1. Completeness of Γ ` ϕ is equivalent to MPL.
2. Completeness of T ` ϕ for enumerable T implies MP.
3. Completeness of T ` ϕ for arbitrary T implies EM.
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3.5 On Markov’s Principle
We show that the stability of Γ `c ϕ and Γ ` ϕ is equivalent to an object-
level version of Markov’s Principle referencing procedures in a concrete model
of computation. For mechanisation purposes, we will use the call-by-value λ-
calculus L [57,22] as model of computation. Since on paper the same proofs can be
carried out for any model of computation we will not go into details of L. We only
need two notions: first, L-enumerability [18, Definition 6], which is defined like
synthetic enumerability, but where the enumerator is an L-computable function.
Secondly, the halting problem for L, defined as Es := “the term s terminates”.
We define the object-level Markov’s Principle MPL as stability of E :
MPL := ∀s. ¬¬Es→ Es
MPL can also be phrased similarly to MP with a condition on the sequence:
Lemma 57. ([22, Theorem 45]) MPL is equivalent to
∀f : N→ B. L-computable f → ¬¬(∃n. f n = tt)→ ∃n. f n = tt.
Corollary 58. MP implies MPL.
We show Lemma 8, i.e. that MPL is equivalent to both the stability of `c and
` for contexts, thereby establishing that completeness of provability for standard
Tarski and Kripke semantics for finite theories is equivalent to MPL.
Lemma 59. ([16, Fact 2.16]) Let p and q be predicates. If p many-one reduces
to q (i.e. ∃f.∀x. px↔ q(fx), written p  q) and q is stable, then p is stable.
Thus, in order to prove the equivalence of the stability of E , Γ ` ϕ, and
Γ `c ϕ, it suffices to give many-one reductions between them. We start with the
two simpler reductions:
Lemma 60. `c `, and thus stability of Γ ` ϕ implies the stability of Γ `c ϕ.
Proof. Using a standard double-negation translation proof. uunionsq
Lemma 61. E  `c, and thus stability of Γ `c ϕ implies MPL.
Proof. E reduces to the halting problem of multi-tape Turing machines [74],
which reduces to the halting problem of single-tape Turing machines [20], which
reduces to the Post correspondence problem [15], which in turn reduces to `c by
adapting [16, Corollary 3.49]. uunionsq
Since p  E for all L-enumerable predicates p [18, Theorem 7], it suffices to
give an L-computable enumeration of type N→ L(F) of provable formulas ` ϕ.
Note that we continue to assume signatures to be (synthetically) enumerable
and do not have to restrict to L-enumerability, which is enabled by the following
signature extension lemma:
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Lemma 62. Let ι be an invertible embedding from Σ to Σ′. Then ` ϕ over Σ if
and only if ` ιϕ over Σ′, where ιϕ is the recursive application of ι to formulas.
Proof. Γ ` ϕ→ ιΓ ` ιϕ follows trivially by induction. For the inverse direction,
we show that Kripke models M over Σ can be extended to Kripke models ιM
over Σ s.t. ρ, u M ϕ ↔ ρ, u ιM ιϕ. Then ιΓ ` ιϕ → Γ ` ϕ follows from
soundness and completness w.r.t. exploding models. uunionsq
Lemma 63. Γ ` ϕ is L-enumerable for any enumerable signature Σ.
Proof. Since Σ is enumerable, it can be injectively embedded via ι into the
maximal signatureΣmax := (N2,N2) where the arity functions are just the second
projections. Since N2 is L-enumerable, terms and formulas over Σmax are also
L-enumerable, and thus provability over Σmax is L-enumerable. By Lemma 62
we obtain that provability over Σ is L-enumerable. uunionsq
Corollary 64. ` E, and thus MPL implies the stability of Γ ` ϕ.
We conclude the section with observations on independence and admissible of
several statements in Coq’s type theory pCuIC. By independence of a statement
P , we mean that neither P nor ¬P is provable in pCuIC without assumptions.
By admissibility of a statement ∀x. P (x)→ Q(x) we mean that whenever P (t)
is provable in pCuIC for a concrete term t without assumptions, Q(t) is as well.
Pédrot and Tabareau [56] show MP independent (Corollary 41) and admissible
(Theorem 33). This transports to MPL as well as stability of deduction systems
and completeness with respect to model-theoretic semantics.
Theorem 65. The following are all independent and admissible in pCuIC:
1. MPL
2. Stability of both Γ `c ϕ and Γ ` ϕ.
3. Completeness of T `c ϕ for enumerable T w.r.t. standard Tarski semantics.
4. Completeness of Γ `c ϕ w.r.t. standard Tarski semantics.
5. Completeness of Γ ` ϕ w.r.t. standard Kripke semantics.
Proof. We exemplarily show (1) and (4), the other proofs are similar.
For (1), MPL is consistent since it is a consequence of EM. Lemma 40 in [56]
shows that no theory conservative over the calculus of inductive constructions
(CIC) can prove both the independence of premise rule IP and MP, by turning
these assumptions into a decider for the halting problem of the untyped term
language of CIC. One can adapt the proof to show that pCuIC cannot prove
both IP and MPL, by constructing a decider for the L-halting problem instead,
which yields a contradiction as well. The admissibility of MPL follows from the
admissibility of MP since a single application of MP suffices to derive MPL.
For (4), independence follows directly from (1) and Theorem 15. For admis-
sibility, assume that Γ  ϕ is provable in pCuIC. By Fact 13, ¬¬(Γ `c ϕ) is
provable in pCuIC. Thus by (2), Γ `c ϕ is provable in pCuIC. uunionsq
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4 Algebraic Semantics
In contrast to the model-theoretic semantics discussed in Section 3, algebraic
semantics are not based on models interpreting the non-logical symbols but
on algebras suitable for interpreting the logical connectives of the syntax. A
formula is valid if it is satisfied by all algebras and completeness follows from the
observation that deduction systems have the corresponding algebraic structure.
Following [63], we discuss complete Heyting and Boolean algebras coinciding
with intuitionistic and classical ND, respectively. We consider all formulas ϕ : F.
Definition 66. A Heyting algebra consists of a preorder (H,≤) and operations
0 : H, u : H → H → H, unionsq : H → H → H, ⇒: H → H → H
for bottom, meet, join, and implication satisfying the following properties:
1. 0 ≤ x
2. z u x ≤ y ↔ z ≤ x⇒ y
3. z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y ↔ z ≤ x u y
4. x ≤ z ∧ y ≤ z ↔ x unionsq y ≤ z
Moreover, H is complete if there is an operation d : (H → P) → H for
arbitrary meets satisfying (∀y ∈ P. x ≤ y)↔ x ≤ dP . ThenH also has arbitrary
joins
⊔
P :=
d
(λx. ∀y ∈ P. y ≤ x) satisfying (∀y ∈ P. y ≤ x)↔ ⊔P ≤ x.
Arbitrary meets and joins indexed by a function F : I → H on a type I
are defined by
d
i F i :=
d
(λx. ∃i. x = F i) and ⊔i F i := ⊔(λx. ∃i. x = F i),
respectively. As we do not require ≤ to be antisymmetric in order to avoid
quotient constructions, we establish equational facts about Heyting algebras only
up to equivalence x ≡ y := x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x rather than actual equality.
Lemma 67. Let H be a Heyting algebra.
1. H is u-unionsq-distributive, i.e. x u (y unionsq z) ≡ (x u y) unionsq (x u z). As a consequence,
x ≤ y unionsq z implies x ≤ (x u y) unionsq (x u z).
2. If H is complete then it is u-⊔-distributive, i.e. xu(⊔i F ) ≡ ⊔i(λi. xuF i).
As a consequence, x ≤ ⊔i F implies x ≤ ⊔i(λi. x u F i).
Proof. By simple algebraic calculations. uunionsq
Note that every Heyting algebra embeds into its down set algebra consisting
of the sets x⇓ := λy. y ≤ x. The MacNeille completion [50] adding arbitrary
meets and joins is a refinement of this embedding.
Fact 68. Every Heyting algebra H embeds into a complete Heyting algebra Hc,
i.e. there is a function f : H → Hc with x ≤ y ↔ f x ≤c f y and:
1. f 0 ≡ 0c
2. f (x⇒ y) ≡ f x⇒c f y
3. f (x u y) ≡ f x uc f y
4. f (x unionsq y) ≡ f x unionsqc f y
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Proof. Given a set X : H → P, we define the sets LX := λx. ∀y ∈ X.x ≤ y
of lower bounds and UX := λx. ∀y ∈ X. y ≤ x of upper bounds of X. We say
that a set X is down-complete if L (UX) ⊆ X. Note that in particular down sets
x⇓ are down-complete and that down-complete sets are downwards closed, i.e.
satisfy x ∈ X whenever x ≤ y for some y ∈ X.
Now consider the type Hc := ΣX.L (UX) ⊆ X of down-complete sets pre-
ordered by set inclusion X ⊆ Y . It is immediate by construction that the oper-
ation
d
c P :=
⋂
P defines arbitrary meets in Hc. Moreover, it is easily verified
that further setting
0c := 0⇓ XucY := X∩Y XunionsqcY := L (U (X∪Y )) X ⇒c Y := λx.∀y ∈ X.xuy ∈ Y
turns Hc into a (hence complete) Heyting algebra. The only non-trivial case is
implication, where X ⇒c Y ≡
d
c(λZ.∃x ∈ X.Z ≡ (λy. y u x ∈ Y )) is a helpful
characterisation to show that X ⇒c Y is down-complete whenever Y is.
Finally, x⇓ clearly is a structure preserving embedding as specified. uunionsq
We now define how formulas can be evaluated in a complete Heyting algebra.
Definition 69. Given a complete Heyting algebra H we extend interpretations
[[_]] : ∀P : PΣ .T|P | → H of atoms to formulas using size recursion by
[[⊥˙]] := 0 [[ϕ∧˙ψ]] := [[ϕ]] u [[ψ]] [[∀˙ϕ]] := dt[[ϕ[t]]]
[[ϕ→˙ψ]] := [[ϕ]]⇒ [[ψ]] [[ϕ∨˙ψ]] := [[ϕ]] unionsq [[ψ]] [[∃˙ϕ]] := ⊔t[[ϕ[t]]]
and to contexts by [[Γ ]] :=
d
λx. ∃ϕ ∈ Γ. x = [[ϕ]]. A formula ϕ is valid in H
whenever x ≤ [[ϕ]] for all x : H.
Note that [[ϕ]] is defined by size recursion to account for the substitution ϕ[t]
needed in the quantifier cases.
We first show that intuitionistic ND is sound for this semantics.
Fact 70. Γ ` ϕ implies ∀σ. [[Γ [σ]]] ≤ [[ϕ[σ]]] in every complete Heyting algebra.
Proof. By induction on Γ ` ϕ, all cases but (DE) and (EE) are trivial.
– (DE) In this case σ is not instantiated, so we leave out the annotations [σ] for
better readability. Suppose that [[Γ ]] ≤ [[ϕ]] unionsq [[ψ]], [[Γ, ϕ]] ≤ [[θ]], and [[Γ, ψ]] ≤
[[θ]], we show that [[Γ ]] ≤ [[θ]]. Applying the first consequence mentioned in
Lemma 67, it suffices to show ([[Γ ]]u [[ϕ]])unionsq ([[Γ ]]u [[ψ]]) ≤ [[θ]]. This means to
show both [[Γ ]] u [[ϕ]] ≤ [[θ]] and [[Γ ]] u [[ψ]] ≤ [[θ]] which both follow from the
assumptions.
– (EE) Suppose that ∀σ. [[Γ [σ]]] ≤ ⊔t[[ϕ[t;σ]]] and ∀σ. [[↑Γ [σ], ϕ[σ]]] ≤ [[↑ψ[σ]]],
we show that [[Γ [σ]]] ≤ [[ψ[σ]]] for a fixed σ. Now applying the second conse-
quence mentioned in Lemma 67, it suffices to show
⊔
t([[Γ [σ]]] u [[ϕ[t;σ]]]) ≤
[[ψ[σ]]]. This means to show [[Γ [σ], ϕ[t;σ]]] ≤ [[ψ[σ]]] for all terms t, which fol-
lows from the second assumption instantiated with t;σ and the observation
that ↑Γ [t;σ] = Γ and ↑ϕ[t;σ] = ϕ. uunionsq
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Corollary 71. Γ ` ϕ implies [[Γ ]] ≤ [[ϕ]] in every complete Heyting algebra.
Secondly turning to completeness, a strategy reminiscent to the case of Kripke
semantics can be employed by exhibiting a universal structure, the so-called
Lindenbaum algebra, that exactly coincides with provability.
Fact 72. The type F of formulas together with the preorder ϕ ` ψ and the logical
connectives as corresponding algebraic operations form a Heyting algebra.
Proof. Straightforward using weakening. uunionsq
We write L for the Lindenbaum algebra (Fact 72) and L for its MacNeille
completion (Fact 68). Formulas are evaluated in L according to Definition 69
using the syntactic atom interpretation [[P t]] := (P t )⇓ .
Lemma 73. Evaluating ϕ in L yields the set of all ψ with ψ ` ϕ, i.e. [[ϕ]] ≡ ϕ⇓ .
Proof. By size induction on ϕ. The case for atoms is by construction and the
cases for all connectives but the quantifiers are immediate since ⇓ preserves the
structure of L as specified in Fact 68. The quantifiers are handled as follows:
– (∀) Let ψ ∈ dt[[ϕ[t]]], we show ↑ψ ` ϕ in order to establish ψ ` ∀˙ϕ. By
Lemma 4 we know that there is a fresh variable x such that ↑ψ ` ϕ if
ψ ` ϕ[x]. The latter follows from the inductive hypothesis for ϕ[x] since
ψ ∈ [[ϕ[x]]] by assumption.
Conversely, let ψ ` ∀˙ϕ, we show ψ ∈ [[ϕ[t]]] for every term t in order to
establish ψ ∈ dt[[ϕ[t]]]. By (AE) we have ψ ` ϕ[t] and conclude ψ ∈ [[ϕ[t]]]
using the inductive hypothesis for ϕ[t].
– (∃) Let ψ ∈ ⊔t[[ϕ[t]]], we want ψ ∈ (∃ϕ) ⇓ . Hence it suffices to show⊔
t[[ϕ[t]]] ⊆ (∃ϕ)⇓ which reduces to [[ϕ[t]]] ⊆ (∃ϕ)⇓ for every t. By induction
we know that [[ϕ[t]]] ≡ ϕ[t]⇓ and conclude ϕ[t]⇓⊆ (∃ϕ)⇓ since ϕ[t] ` ∃ϕ.
Conversely, let ψ ` ∃ϕ, we show that ψ ∈ ⊔t[[ϕ[t]]]. By construction of ⊔
we have to show that ψ ∈ X for all down-closed X with ∀t. [[ϕ[t]]] ⊆ X.
By down-closedness it suffices to show ψ ∈ L (UX) and hence ψ ` θ for
θ ∈ UX. Applying (EE), this reduces to ↑ψ,ϕ `↑θ and, employing Lemma 4,
to ψ,ϕ[x] ` θ for some fresh x. This follows since already ϕ[x] ` θ given that
ϕ[x] ∈ ϕ[x]⇓≡ [[ϕ[x]]] ⊆ X and θ ∈ UX. uunionsq
Theorem 74. If ϕ is valid in every complete Heyting algebra, then ` ϕ.
Proof. If ϕ is valid, then Lemma 73 implies that ψ ` ϕ forall ψ. By e.g. choosing
the tautology ψ := ⊥˙→˙⊥˙ we can derive ` ϕ since obviously ` ⊥˙→˙⊥˙. uunionsq
Switching to classical logic, we call a Heyting algebra Boolean if it satisfies
(x⇒y)⇒x ≤ x for all x and y, hence directly accommodating Peirce’s law (P).
Then first, classical deduction is sound for interpretation in Boolean algebras.
Fact 75. Γ `c ϕ implies [[Γ ]] ≤ [[ϕ]] in every complete Boolean algebra.
Proof. As in Corollary 71, the classical rule (P) is sound by definition. uunionsq
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Secondly, we establish the completeness of classical deduction by generalising
the previous proof to all deduction systems subsuming intuitionistic ND. So we
fix a predicate `i : L(F) → F → P satisfying the rules of intuitionistic ND
(Definition 89), weakening (Lemma 3), as well as the equivalences concerning
fresh variables stated in Lemma 4, and replay the construction from before.
Fact 76. The type F of formulas together with the preorder ϕ `i ψ and the
logical connectives as corresponding algebraic operations form a Heyting algebra.
We denote the Lindenbaum algebra of `i by Li and its completion by Li.
Lemma 77. Evaluating ϕ in Li yields the set of all ψ with ϕ `i ψ.
If we instantiate `i with `c we can conclude completeness as follows:
Theorem 78. If ϕ is valid in every complete Boolean algebra, then `c ϕ.
Proof. We first observe that the MacNeille completion of a Boolean algebra is
Boolean. Hence Lc is Boolean since Lc is Boolean due to the classical rule (P).
Then from ϕ valid in Lc we can deduce `c ϕ with Lemma 77 as before. uunionsq
Note that this general construction could of course be instantiated to intu-
itionistic ND in order to derive Theorem 74 in the first place, same as to other
intermediate logics that are not considered in this paper.
5 Dialogue Game Semantics
Dialogues are games modeling a proponent defending the validity of a formula
against an opponent. In the terminology of Felscher [14], the dialogues we con-
sider in this section are the intuitionistic E-dialogues, generalised over their local
rules (F,Fa,A,B,D−). Given abstract types for formulas F and attacks A, the
relation a |ψ B ϕ states that a player may attack ϕ : F with a : A by possibly
admitting a unique ψ : O(F). If ψ = ∅, no admission is made. Each a : A has an
associated set Da of formulas that may be admitted to fend off a. Special rules
restrict when the proponent may admit atomic formulas, members of the set Fa.
We write a B ϕ for a | ∅ B ϕ. The local rules of first-order logic are given below
with atomic formulas Fa := {P t | P : PΣ}.
a∨˙ B ϕ∨˙ψ Da∨˙ = {ϕ,ψ} a→˙ | pϕq B ϕ→˙ψ Da→˙ = {ψ} aL B ϕ∧˙ψ DaL = {ϕ}
at B ∀˙ϕ Dat = {ϕ[t]} a⊥˙ B ⊥˙ Da⊥˙ = {} aR B ϕ∧˙ψ DaR = {ψ}
a∃˙ B ∃˙ϕ Da∃˙ = {ϕ[t] | t : T}
In contrast to their usual presentation as sequences of alternating moves, we
define dialogues as state transition systems over elements (Ao, c) of the type
L(F) × A containing the opponent’s admissions (Ao) and last attack (c). The
proponent opens each round by picking a move. She can defend against the
opponent’s attack c by admitting a justified defense formula ϕ ∈ Dc, meaning
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ϕ ∈ Fa implies ϕ ∈ Ao. Alternatively, she can launch an attack a against any of
the opponent’s admissions if the admission resulting from a is justified.
ϕ ∈ Dc justified Ao ϕ
(Ao, c) Ep ϕ
PD
ϕ ∈ Ao a |ψ B ϕ justified Ao ψ
(Ao, c) Ep (a, ϕ)
PA
Given such a move m, the opponent reacts to it by transforming the state s
into s′ (written as s ; m  Eo s′). The opponent may attack the proponent’s
defense formula (OA), defend against her attack (OD) or counter her attack by
attacking her admission (OC). We define pϕq :: A := ϕ :: A and ∅ :: A := A.
c′ |ψ B ϕ
(Ao, c) ;ϕ Eo (ψ :: Ao, c′)
OA
ψ ∈ Da
(Ao, c) ; (a, ϕ) Eo (ψ :: Ao, c)
OD
a | pψq B ϕ c′ | θ B ψ
(Ao, c) ; (a, ϕ) Eo (θ :: Ao, c′)
OC
A formula ϕ is then considered E-valid if it is non-atomic and for all c |ψBϕ,
there is a winning strategy WinE ([ψ], c) as defined below.
s Ep m ∀s′. s ;m Eo s′ →WinE s′
WinE s
Following the strategy of [66], we first prove the soundness and completeness
of the sequent calculus LJD which is defined in terms of the same notions as
the dialogues. Indeed, as witnessed in the proofs of soundness and complete-
ness, derivations of LJD are isomorphic to winning strategies, the R- and L-rule
corresponding to a proponent defense and attack, their premises matching the
possible opponent responses to each move. The statement Γ ⇒D S means that
the context Γ entails the disjunction of the formulas contained in the set S.
ϕ ∈ S justified Γ ϕ
∀a′θ. a′ | θ B ϕ → Γ, θ ⇒D Da
Γ ⇒D S
R
ϕ ∈ Γ justified Γ ψ
a |ψ B ϕ ∀ θ ∈ Da. Γ, θ ⇒D S ∀a′θ. a′ | θ B ψ → Γ, τ ⇒D Da′
Γ ⇒D S
L
Theorem 79. Any formula ϕ is E-valid if and only if one can derive []⇒D {ϕ}.
Proof. WinE (Ao, c) → Ao ⇒D Dc holds by induction on WinE (Ao, c). From
this, completeness follows with an application of the R-rule, transforming a win-
ning strategy WinE ([ψ], c) for any c |ψ B ϕ into [ψ] ⇒D Dc. Soundness can be
proven symmetrically. uunionsq
To arrive at a more traditional soundness and completeness result, we show
that one can translate between derivations in LJD and the intuitionistic sequent
calculus LJ deriving sequents Γ ⇒J ϕ as defined in Definition 92 of Appendix B.
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Lemma 80. One can derive Γ ⇒D {ϕ} if and only if one can derive Γ ⇒J ϕ.
Proof. Completeness is generalised as below and shown by induction on Γ⇒DS:
Γ ⇒D S → ∀ϕ. (∀ψ, Γ ⊆ Γ ′. Γ ′ ⇒J ψ → Γ ′ ⇒J ϕ)→ Γ ⇒J ϕ
Soundness follows analogously from Γ ⇒J ϕ→ ∀σ. Γ [σ]⇒D {ϕ[σ]}. uunionsq
Corollary 81. Any formula ϕ is E-valid if and only if one can derive []⇒J ϕ.
We now extend the soundness and completeness results to D-dialogues, which
lift the E-dialogues’ restriction on the opponent to only react to the directly
preceding proponent move. We formalise D-dialogues as a state transition system
over (Ap, Cp, Ao, Co) : L(F)×L(A)×L(F)×L(A) where A− contains the open
admissions and C− the unanswered challenges against the respective players. As
before, the proponent may defend against the last open challenge against her
(PD) or attack one of the opponent’s admissions (PA).
ϕ ∈ Dc justified Ao ϕ
(Ap, c :: Cp, Ao, Co) Dp (ϕ :: Ap, Cp, Ao, Co)
PD
ϕ ∈ Ao justified Ao ψ a |ψ B ϕ
(Ap, Cp, Ao, Co) Dp (ψ :: Ap, Cp, Ao, a :: Co)
PA
Symmetrically, the opponent may do the same, although she may still only ever
attack each of proponent’s admissions once.
ϕ ∈ Da
(Ap, Cp, Ao, a :: Co) Do (Ap, Cp, ϕ :: Ao, Co)
OD
c |ψ B ϕ
(Ap ++ϕ :: A
′
p, Cp, Ao, Co) Do (Ap ++A′p, c :: Cp, ψ :: Ao, Co)
OA
Winning strategies and validity for D-dialogues are defined completely anal-
ogously to those for E-dialogues. As a winning strategy for D-dialogues contains
information on how to fend off strictly more attacks than its E-counterpart,
the proof strategy of completeness of LJD with regards to E-strategies can be
extended to D-strategies.
Lemma 82. If ϕ is D-valid, one can derive []⇒D {ϕ}.
Proof. We show WinD (Ap, c :: Cp, Ao, Co) → Ao ⇒D Dc by induction on
WinD (Ap, c :: Cp, Ao, Co). The result follows from the definitions of validity. uunionsq
Proving LJD sound for D-dialogues is more involved. First, we make an
observation about the structure of a winning strategy for D-dialogues that was
derived from an LJD derivation: If the derivation ends in an application of (L),
telling the proponent to attack one of the opponent’s admissions via an attack
a, it only indicates how to continue to fend off the current challenge against the
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proponent after the opponent admits some formula from Da. By attacking one
of the opponent’s admissions, the proponent thus defers the continuation of her
“current line of argument” in the resulting D-strategy until the opponent chooses
to react, which by the rules of D-dialogues may be later than next turn.
We define a new class of dialogues, the S-dialogues, which encode this observa-
tion and aiding us in stating appropriate invariants in the proof of soundness. We
formalise them as a transition system over (Ap, Ao, D) : L(F)×L(F)×L(A×A)
where a pair (a, c) ∈ D represents the proponent deferring her response to c until
the opponent responds to a. The proponent, along a state (Ap, Ao, D), is given
a current challenge c to react to. She can either defend against that challenge
(PD) or defer responding by attacking one of the opponent’s admissions (PA).
ϕ ∈ Dc justified Ao ϕ
(Ap, Ao, D) ; c Sp (ϕ :: Ap, Ao, D)
PD
ϕ ∈ Ao justified Ao ψ a |ψ B ϕ
(Ap, Ao, D) ; c Sp (ψ :: Ap, Ao, (a, c) :: D)
PA
The opponent then can either reissue the current challenge by defending against
the proponent’s attack (OD) or issue a new challenge by attacking one of the
proponent’s admissions (OA).
ϕ ∈ Da
(Ap, Ao, (a, c) :: D) So (Ap, ϕ :: Ao, D) ; c
OD
c |ψ B ϕ
(Ap ++ϕ :: A
′
p, Ao, D) So (Ap ++A′p, ψ :: Ao, D) ; c
OA
The winning strategies and notion of validity for S-dialogues are again de-
fined analogously to the other two kinds of dialogues. As S-dialogues are es-
sentially just D-dialogues with a stack structure imposed on Cp and Co (hence
S -dialogues), we can translate their winning strategies back into ones for D-
dialogues. Importantly, this means it suffices to show soundness for S-dialogues.
Lemma 83. Any S-valid formula ϕ is also D-valid.
Proof. We show WinS (Ap, Ao, D) ; c→WinD (Ap, c :: pi1D,Ao, pi2D) by induc-
tion on WinS . The claim follows from the definitions of validity. uunionsq
Thus what remains is to prove that LJD is sound with regards to S-validity.
The difficulty of this proof stems from the fact that the resulting winning strategy
will be much “deeper” than the LJD derivation because the opponent may now
perform all possible responses to a proponent move within the same game instead
of being restricted to picking only one. This in turn means that a simple induction
on the derivation will not suffice for the proof, instead requiring a more involved
induction principle. We thus first give the proof, leaving the induction principle
abstract and then define it afterwards.
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Theorem 84. If []⇒D {ϕ} can be derived then ϕ is S-valid.
Proof. For this, we prove a generalised claim, namely that for all Ap, Ao, D, c if
(1) for each ϕ ∈ Ap there is a Γ ⊆ Ao and a family ∀ψ | aB ϕ. ψ :: Γ ⇒D Da
(2) for each (a, c) ∈ D there is a Γ ⊆ Ao and a family ∀θ ∈ Da. θ :: Γ ⇒D Dc
(3) there is a Γ ⊆ Ao and a derivation Γ ⇒D Dc
then we can derive WinS (Ap, Ao, D) ; c. We first show by case distinction on the
derivation of Γ ⇒D Dc that there is a transition (Ap, Ao, D) ; c Sp (A′p, Ao, D′)
such that A′p and D′ satisfy invariants (1) and (2).
(R) Then there is some justified ϕ ∈ Dc such that ∀a |ψ B ϕ. ψ :: Γ ⇒D Da.
Then the proponent will defend by admitting ϕ. Invariant (1) then extends
to A′p := ϕ :: Ap.
(L) Then there is some ϕ ∈ Γ and a justified attack a |ψ B ϕ such that both
∀θ ∈ Da. θ :: Γ ⇒D Dc and ∀a′ | θ B ψ. θ :: Γ ⇒D Da′ . Then the proponent
will attack with a. The invariants then extend to ψ :: Ap and (a, c) :: D.
Now we show that any opponent moves from (A′p, Ao, D′) lead to a winning
position, again by case distinction.
(OD) Then D′ = (a, c) :: D′′ and the opponent just admitted some θ ∈ Da. By
invariant (2), there is a Γ ⊆ Ao with θ :: Γ ⇒D Dc′ . Then we can obtain
WinS (A′p, θ :: Ao, D′′) ; c′ per inductive hypothesis as θ :: Γ ⊆ θ :: Ao and
invariant (3) thus holds for c′.
(OA) Then A′p = A ++ψ :: A′′ and the opponent just attacked with c′ | θ B ψ.
By invariant (1), there is Γ ⊆ Ao with θ :: Γ ⇒D Dc′ . Then we can obtain
WinS (A′ ++A′′, θ :: Ao, D′) ; c′ as θ :: Γ ⊆ θ :: Ao and invariant (3) thus
holds for c′.
Note that when applying the inductive hypothesis we are implicitly using the
fact that the invariants all extend to θ :: Ao. uunionsq
Corollary 85. Any formula ϕ for which []⇒D {ϕ} can be derived is D-valid.
Corollary 86. A formula ϕ is E-valid if and only if it is D-valid.
Now all that remains is finding the correct induction principle. Intuitively,
the proof above is well-founded as each “inductive step” replaces one of the (fam-
ilies of) derivations from the invariants with its specialisation or sub-derivations
twice, once for the proponent move, once for the opponent move. We can abstract
this observation into the following relation.
Definition 87. Let R : X → X → P be a relation on some type X. Then
we define ≺+R : L(X) → L(X) → P to be the transitive closure of ≺R, where
A ≺R B holds iff there are B′, B′′, C : L(X) such that B = B′ ++x :: B′′, for all
c ∈ C we have Rcx, and A is a permutation of B′ ++C ++B′′.
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For the proof of Theorem 84 we then choose X to be the sum of the three
kinds of (families of) derivations used in the invariants and the relation R be-
ing the specialisation and sub-derivation relation on them. The induction then
proceeds on ≺+R on a list containing all the families asserted by the invariants.
Note that the list-splitting of ≺R exactly mirrors the act of replacing one invari-
ant with its specialisation or sub-derivations. The permutations are a technical
accommodation that make it easier to state the invariants formally by allowing
us to list the invariants in a fixed order as we can “move the new invariants into
place” after each step. Finally, the transitivity is needed as each inductive step
of Theorem 84 takes two such list-splitting steps, one for the proponent and one
for the opponent.
Lemma 88. If R : X → X → P is well-founded then so is ≺+R.
Proof. We first show that A ≺′R B := ∃B′, B′′, C. B = B′ ++x :: B′′ ∧ A =
B′ ++C ++B′′ ∧ ∀c ∈ C.R c x is well-founded. To this end, we first prove that
≺′R being well-founded on A and B means it is well-founded on A ++B by
well-founded induction on A and B along ≺′R. Then we can show that ≺′R is
well-founded on singletons [x] by R-induction on x as for any Rcx we know
that ≺′R is well-founded on [c] per inductive hypothesis which we can extend
to arbitrary lists C of such Rcx using the previous fact. The fact can then be
applied again to obtain well-foundedness of ≺′R on arbitrary lists.
Now we show that if A ≺′R B and if B is a permutation of B′ then there is
a permutation A′ of A with A′ ≺′R B′ per induction on B. With this, we can
show that ≺′R being well-founded on A entails that ≺R is well-founded on any
permutation of A, again by induction on A. From this, well-foundedness of ≺R
follows from the well-foundedness of ≺′R.
Lastly, we use the fact that transitive closure maintains well-foundedness. uunionsq
6 Discussion
We have analysed the completeness of common deduction systems for first-order
logic with regards to various explanations of logical validity. Model-theoretic se-
mantics are the most direct implementation of the idea that terms represent
objects of a domain of discourse. Particularly in a formal meta-theory such
as constructive type theory, model-theoretic completeness justifies the common
practice to verify consequences of a first-order axiomatisation by studying mod-
els satisfying corresponding meta-level axioms. However, model-theoretic seman-
tics typically do not admit constructive completeness and, if not generalised to
exploding models, require Markov’s Principle as soon as falsity is involved. Con-
trarily, evidence for the validity of a first-order formula in algebraic semantics
and game semantics can be algorithmically transformed into syntactic deriva-
tions.
The analysis of the completeness theorem for classical first-order logic bene-
fited from the use of constructive type theory with an impredicative universe of
propositions as underlying system. Constructive type theory has fewer built-in
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assumptions than the systems usually used in both classical and constructive re-
verse mathematics, allowing for sharper equivalence results. In classical reverse
mathematics [64], one uses classical logic freely (i.e. EM is provable), but does not
assume strong function or set existence principles, nor choice axioms, and thus
WKL is not provable in the weakest considered base system RCA0. In contrast,
constructive reverse mathematics [35] is based on Bishop’s constructive mathe-
matics BISH [5] as for instance formalised by predicative type theories [52]. BISH
is based on intuitionistic logic only (i.e. neither EM nor MP are provable), but
countable and dependent choice axioms are provable,3 turning WKL into a purely
logical axiom, equivalent to the lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO [34]
and in particular into a consequence of EM. Thus, BISH and predicative type
theories are insensitive to the role of WKL w.r.t. the completeness theorem as
formulated in Theorem 42. In type theory with a universe of propositions how-
ever, EM likely does not imply WKL and thus EM ∧WKL becomes a sensible
proposition with interesting equivalences.
Of course, there are more semantic accounts of first-order logic than the selec-
tion studied in this paper. For instance, there are hybrid variants such as inter-
preting both terms in a model and logical operations in an algebra, or dialogues
with atomic formulas represented as underlying games. More generally, there
are entirely different approaches like realisability semantics or proof-theoretic
semantics, all coming with interesting completeness problems worth analysing
in constructive type theory. More ideas for future work are outlined after a brief
summary of related work.
6.1 Related Work
Our analysis of completeness in constructive type theory was motivated by pre-
vious work [16], carried out in Wehr’s bachelor’s thesis [73], and is directly influ-
enced by multiple prior works. In their analysis of Henkin’s proof, Herbelin and
Ilik [31] give a constructive model existence proof and the constructivisation
of completeness via exploding models. Herbelin and Lee [32] demonstrate the
constructive Kripke completeness proof for minimal models and mention how to
extend the approach to standard and exploding models. Scott [63] establishes
completeness of free logic interpreted in a hybrid semantics comprising model-
theoretic and algebraic components. Urzyczyn and Sørensen [66] give a proof of
dialogue completeness via generalised dialogues for classical propositional logic.
The first proof that the completeness of intuitionistic first-order logic entails
Markov’s Principle was given by Kreisel [42], although he attributes the proof
idea to Gödel. The proof has since inspired a range of works deriving related
non-constructivity results for different kinds of completeness [2,43,47,53,54,55].
Krivtsov has analysed the necessity of WKL for completeness proofs for both
classical and intuitionistic first-order logic w.r.t. decidable models [45,46].
The completeness of first-order logic has been mechanised in many interac-
tive theorem provers such as Isabelle/HOL [6,60,61], NuPRL [8,71], Mizar [7],
3 The universal assumption of countable choice for constructive mathematics is criticised e.g. by
Richman [58,59].
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Lean [27], and Coq [32,33,24]. Among them, [8] and [33] share our focus on the
constructivity of completeness. Constable and Bickford [8] give a constructive
proof of completeness for the BHK-realisers of full intuitionistic first-order logic
in NuPRL. Their proof is fully constructive when realisers are restricted to be
normal terms, requiring Brouwer’s fan theorem when lifting that restriction. In
his PhD thesis [33], Ilik mechanises multiple constructive proofs of first-order
completeness in Coq. Especially noteworthy are the highly non-standard, con-
structivised Kripke models for full classical and intuitionistic first-order logic he
presents in Chapters 2 and 3. Gilbert and Hermant [24] describe a normalisation-
by-evaluation completeness proof using Heyting algebras and implement it for
propositional logic in Coq.
6.2 Future Work
We plan to further extend our constructive analysis and Coq library of com-
pleteness theorems to all logical connectives and to uncountable signatures, both
relying on additional logical assumptions.
Concerning model-theoretic semantics, our analysis left open at least three
interesting questions: First, we have shown that completeness for the classical
∀,→,⊥-fragment w.r.t. omniscient models and arbitrary theories is equivalent
to both EM and WKL. Completeness for the ∀,→,⊥-fragment w.r.t. omniscient
models and enumerable theories certainly implies MP and WKLD, but it is un-
clear how to obtain an equivalence. Restricting completeness to contexts implies
MPL, but a formulation of WKLD for L-computable functions is equivalent to
falsity, due to Kleene’s tree [40]. Secondly, we only prove that completeness for
classical first-order logic with all connectives is equivalent to EM, but leave open
what the necessary and sufficient principles are to obtain completeness for clas-
sical first-order logic with all connectives w.r.t. contexts or enumerable theories.
Thirdly, we have not considered decidable Kripke models nor intuitionistic com-
pleteness for full first-order logic. Veldman’s constructivisation of completeness
for intuitionistic first-order logic relies on decidable models and the fan theorem
(which is a consequence of WKL [36]) to treat disjunction [72]. It is an interest-
ing direction for future research whether the fan theorem can be avoided in the
presence of disjunction when using propositional models as we do in this paper.
Subsequently, it would be interesting to study other aspects of model theory
in the setting of constructive type theory, for instance the Löwenheim-Skolem
theorems or first-order axiomatisations of arithmetic and set theory. Another
idea is to analyse the completeness of second-order logic interpreted in Henkin
semantics, as this formalism suffices to express the higher-order axiomatisation of
set theory studied in [39]. Furthermore, the contemporary syntactic presentation
of dialogues we studied differs from that first put forward by Lorenzen [48,49]
which was distinctly more model-theoretic, raising the question whether the
constructivity of its completeness results mirrors those for other model theoretic
semantics within this work. Lastly, we conjecture that MPL is strictly weaker
than MP, but are not aware of a proof.
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A Notes on the Coq Mechanisation
Our mechanisation consists of about 7500 lines of code, with an even split be-
tween specification and proofs. The code is structured as follows.
Section Specification Proofs
Preliminaries Autosubst 169 53
Preliminaries for F∗ 680 599
Tarski Semantics 655 682
Extended Tarski Semantics 130 203
Compactness and WKL 266 588
Kripke Semantics 342 255
On Markov’s Principle 593 978
Preliminaries for F 523 430
Heyting Semantics 297 456
Dialogue Semantics 563 539
Total 4564 5217
In general, we find that Coq provides the ideal grounds for mechanising
projects like ours. It has external libraries supporting the mechanisation of syn-
tax, enough automation to support the limited amounts we need and allows
constructive reverse mathematics due to its axiomatic minimality.
In the remainder of the section, we elaborate on noteworthy design choices
of the mechanisation.
Formalisation of binders There are various competing techniques to mechanise
binders in proof assistants. In first-order logic, binders occur in quantification.
The chosen technique especially affects the definition of deduction systems and
can considerably ease or impede proofs of standard properties like weakening.
We opted for a de Bruijn representation of variables and binders with parallel
substitutions. The Autosubst 2 tool [69] provides convenient automation for the
definition of and proofs about this representation of syntax.
Notably, our representation then results in very straightforward proofs for
weakening with only 5 lines. In contrast, using other representations for binders
results in considerably more complicated weakening proofs, e.g. 150 lines in an
approach using names [16] and 95 lines in an approach using traced syntax [32].
Also note that first-order logic has the simplest structure of binders possible:
Since quantifiers range over terms, but terms do not contain binders, we do not
need a prior notion of renaming, as usually standard in de Bruijn presentations
of syntax. This observation results in more compact code (because usually, every
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statement on substitutions has to be proved for renamings first, with oftentimes
the same proof) and was incorporated into Autosubst 2, which now does not
generate renamings if they are not needed. Furthermore, we remark that the
HOAS encoding of such simple binding structures results in a strictly positive
inductive type and would thus be in principle definable in Coq.
Formalisation of signatures Our whole development is parametrised against a
signature, defined as a typeclass in Coq:
Class Signature := B_S { Funcs : Type; fun_ar : Funcs -> nat ;
Preds : Type; pred_ar : Preds -> nat }.
We implement term and predicate application using the dependent vector type.
While the vector type is known to cause issues in dependent programming, in
this instance it was the best choice. Recursion on terms is accepted by Coq’s
guardness checker, and while the generated induction principle (as is always
the case for nested inductives) is too weak, a sufficient version can easily be
implemented by hand:
Inductive vec_in (A : Type) (a : A) : forall n, vector A n -> Type :=
| vec_inB n (v : vector A n) : vec_in a (cons a v)
| vec_inS a’ n (v :vector A n) : vec_in a v -> vec_in a (cons a’ v).
Lemma strong_term_ind (p : term -> Type) :
(forall x, p (var_term x)) ->
(forall F v, (forall t, vec_in t v -> p t) -> p (Func F v)) ->
forall (t : term), p t.
Syntactic fragments There are essentially four ways to mechanise the syntactic
fragment F∗. First, we could parametrise the type of formulas with tags, as done
in [16], or abstract types of connectives, as done in [38], and second, we could use
well-explored techniques for modular syntax in Coq [37,11,23]. However, both of
these approaches would not be compatible with the Autosubst tool. Additionally,
modular syntax would force users of our developed library for first-order logic
to work on the peculiar representation of syntax using containers or functors
instead of regular inductive types.
The third option is to only define the type F, and then define a predicate
on this formulas characterising the fragment F∗. This approach introduces many
additional assumptions in almost all statements, decreasing their readability and
yielding many simple but repetitive proof obligations. Furthermore, we would
have to parameterise natural deduction over predicates as well, in order for the
(IE) rule to not introduce terms e.g. containing ∃˙ when only deductions over F∗
should be considered.
To make the mechanisation as clear and reusable as possible, we chose the
fourth and most simple possible approach: We essentially duplicate the contents
of Section 2 for both F∗ and F, resulting in two independent developments on
top of the two preliminary parts.
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Parametrised deduction systems When defining the minimal, intuitionistic, and
classical versions of natural deduction, a similar issue arises. Here, we chose to
use one single predicate definition, where the rules for explosion and Peirce can
be enabled or disabled using tags, which are parameters of the predicate.
Inductive peirce := class | intu.
Inductive bottom := expl | lconst.
Inductive prv : forall (p : peirce) (b : bottom),
list (form) -> form -> Prop := (* ... *).
We can then define all considered variants of ND by fixing those parameters:
Notation "A `CE phi" := (@prv class expl A phi) (at level 30).
Notation "A `CL phi" := (@prv class lconst A phi) (at level 30).
Notation "A `IE phi" := (@prv intu expl A phi) (at level 30).
This definition allows us to give for instance a general weakening proof,
which can then be instantiated to the different versions. Similarly, we can give
a parametrised soundness proof, and depending on the parameters fix required
properties on the models used in the definition of validity.
Object tactics At several parts of our developments we have to build concrete
ND derivations. This can always be done by explicitly applying the constructors
of the ND predicate, which however becomes tedious quickly. We thus developed
object tactics reminiscent of the tactics available in Coq. The tactic ointros for
instance applies the (II) rule, whereas the tactic oapply can apply hypotheses,
i.e. combine the rules (IE) and (C). All object tactics are in the file FullND.v.
Extraction to λ-calculus The proof that completeness of provability w.r.t. stan-
dard Tarski and Kripke semantics is equivalent to MPL crucially relies on an
L-enumeration of provable formulas. While giving a Coq enumeration is easy
using techniques described in [16], the translation of any function to a model of
computation is considered notoriously hard. We use the framework by Forster
and Kunze [19] which allows the automated translation of Coq functions to L.
Using the framework was mostly easy and spared us considerable mecha-
nisation effort. However, the framework covers only simple types, whereas our
representation of both terms and formulas contains the dependent vector type.
We circumvent this problem by defining a non-dependent term type term’ and a
predicate wf characterising exactly the terms in correspondence with our original
type of terms.
Inductive term’ := var_term’ : nat -> term’ | Func’ (name : nat)
| App’ : term’ -> term’ -> term’.
Inductive varornot := isvar | novar.
Inductive wf : varornot -> term’ -> Prop :=
| wf_var n : wf isvar (var_term’ n)
| wf_fun f : wf novar (Func’ f)
| wf_app v s t : wf v s -> wf novar t -> wf novar (App’ s t).
Completeness Theorems for FOL Analysed in Constructive Type Theory 37
We then define a formula type form’ based on term’ and a suitable deduc-
tion system. One can give a bijection between well-formed non-dependent terms
term’ and dependent terms term and prove the equivalence of the corresponding
deduction systems under this bijection.
Functions working on term’ and form’ were easily extracted to L using the
framework, yielding an L-enumerability proof for ND essentially with no manual
mechanisation effort.
Usage of Axioms As the aim of this project is to analyse the minimal assump-
tions underlying completeness theorems, our mechanisation is in principle set up
such to not introduce additional axioms. Sole exception is the axiom of func-
tional extensionality, which is currently required by the Autosubst tool to keep
the proof terms small when rewriting with point-wise equal substitutions. Auto-
subst could of course be extended with a mode using setoid rewriting instead of
appealing to functional extensionality, and if willing to waive the tool support,
one can manually mechanise first-order logic axiom-free as done in [38].
Library of mechanised undecidable problems in Coq We take the mechanisation
of synthetic undecidability from [16], which is part of the Coq library of mecha-
nised undecidable problems [21]. The reduction from L-halting to provability is
factored via Turing machines, Minsky machines, binary stack machines and the
Post correspondence problem (PCP), all part of the library as well.
Equations package Defining non-structurally recursive functions is sometimes
considered hard in Coq and other proof assistants based on dependent type the-
ory. One such example is the function [[_]] used to embed formulas into Heyting
algebras (Definition 69). We use the Equations package [68] to define this func-
tion by recursion on the size of the formula, ignoring terms. The definition then
becomes entirely straightforward and the provided simp tactic, while sometimes
a bit premature, enables compact proofs.
B Overview of Deduction Systems
Definition 89. Intuitionistic natural deduction is defined by the following rules:
ϕ ∈ Γ
Γ ` ϕ C
Γ ` ⊥˙
Γ ` ϕ E
Γ, ϕ ` ψ
Γ ` ϕ→˙ψ II
Γ ` ϕ→˙ψ Γ ` ϕ
Γ ` ϕ IE
Γ ` ϕ Γ ` ψ
Γ ` ϕ∧˙ψ CI
Γ ` ϕ∧˙ψ
Γ ` ϕ CE1
Γ ` ϕ∧˙ψ
Γ ` ψ CE2
Γ ` ϕ
Γ ` ϕ∨˙ψ DI1
Γ ` ψ
Γ ` ϕ∨˙ψ DI2
Γ ` ϕ∨˙ψ Γ, ϕ ` θ Γ, ψ ` θ
Γ ` θ DE
↑Γ ` ϕ
Γ ` ∀˙ϕ AI
Γ ` ∀˙ϕ
Γ ` ϕ[t] AE
Γ ` ϕ[t]
Γ ` ∃˙ϕ EI
Γ ` ∃˙ϕ ↑Γ, ϕ `↑ψ
Γ ` ψ EE
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We write ` ϕ whenever ϕ is intuitionistically provable from the empty context.
Definition 90. Classical natural deduction is defined by the following rules:
ϕ ∈ Γ
Γ `c ϕ C
Γ `c ⊥˙
Γ `c ϕ E
Γ, ϕ `c ψ
Γ `c ϕ→˙ψ II
Γ `c ϕ→˙ψ Γ `c ϕ
Γ `c ϕ IE
Γ `c ϕ Γ `c ψ
Γ `c ϕ∧˙ψ CI
Γ `c ϕ∧˙ψ
Γ `c ϕ CE1
Γ `c ϕ∧˙ψ
Γ `c ψ CE2
Γ `c ϕ
Γ `c ϕ∨˙ψ
DI1
Γ `c ψ
Γ `c ϕ∨˙ψ
DI2
Γ `c ϕ∨˙ψ Γ, ϕ `c θ Γ, ψ `c θ
Γ `c θ DE
↑Γ `c ϕ
Γ `c ∀˙ϕ
AI
Γ `c ∀˙ϕ
Γ `c ϕ[t]
AE
Γ `c ϕ[t]
Γ `c ∃˙ϕ
EI
Γ `c ∃˙ϕ ↑Γ, ϕ `c↑ψ
Γ `c ψ
EE
Γ `c ((ϕ→˙ψ)→˙ϕ)→˙ϕ P
We write `c ϕ whenever ϕ is classically provable from the empty context.
Definition 91. The intuitionistic sequent calculus LJT is defined as follows:
Γ ;ϕ⇒ϕ A
Γ ;ϕ⇒ψ ϕ ∈ Γ
Γ⇒ψ C
Γ⇒ϕ Γ ;ψ⇒θ
Γ ;ϕ→˙ψ⇒θ IL
Γ, ϕ⇒ψ
Γ⇒ϕ→˙ψ IR
Γ ;ϕ[t]⇒ψ
Γ ; ∀˙ϕ⇒ψ AL
↑Γ⇒ϕ
Γ⇒∀˙ϕ AR
Γ⇒⊥˙
Γ⇒ϕ E
Definition 92. The intuitionistic sequent calculus LJ is defined as follows:
Γ, ϕ⇒J ϕ A
Γ, ϕ, ϕ⇒J ψ
Γ,ϕ⇒J ψ C
Γ ⇒J ψ
Γ,ϕ⇒J ψ W
Γ, ψ, ϕ, Γ ′ ⇒J θ
Γ, ϕ, ψ, Γ ′ ⇒J θ P
Γ ⇒J ⊥˙
Γ ⇒J ϕ E
Γ ⇒J ϕ Γ, ψ ⇒J θ
Γ, ϕ→˙ψ ⇒J θ IL
Γ, ϕ⇒J ψ
Γ ⇒J ϕ→˙ψ IR
Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒J θ
Γ, ϕ∧˙ψ ⇒J θ CL
Γ ⇒J ϕ Γ ⇒J ψ
Γ ⇒J ϕ∧˙ψ CR
Γ, ϕ⇒J θ Γ, ψ ⇒J θ
Γ, ϕ∨˙ψ ⇒J θ DL
Γ ⇒J ϕ
Γ ⇒J ϕ∨˙ψ
DR1
Γ ⇒J ψ
Γ ⇒J ϕ∨˙ψ
DR2
Γ, ϕ[t]⇒J ψ
Γ, ∀˙ϕ⇒J ψ
AL
↑Γ ⇒J ϕ
Γ ⇒J ∀˙ϕ
AR
↑Γ, ϕ⇒J↑ψ
Γ, ∃˙ϕ⇒J ψ
EL
Γ ⇒J ϕ[t]
Γ ⇒J ∃˙ϕ
ER
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